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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HAS PLAN COLOMBIA IGNORED NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES?**

by

Celso Andrade-Garzon

June 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Hy Rothstein
Brian Greenshields

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HAS PLAN COLOMBIA IGNORED NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES?

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The United States government has two main concerns in South America's Andean region. The first is drug production and trafficking. This study focuses on the drug supply from the Andean region. The second concern is the insurgency conducted by Colombian narco-guerilla groups. The Colombian government is dedicated to defeating those illegal groups as the main cause of regional violence. Their primarily military strategy, implemented by local government, is Plan Colombia, which in the last seven years has received about five billion dollars in U.S. funding. Plan Colombia has geopolitical impacts on diplomacy, economics, national security, and the population's well-being. Plan Colombia has resulted in second-order effects on the neighboring countries of Ecuador and Venezuela, increasing border violence, population displacement and the creation of refugees, environmental damage, black market weapons trading and drug trafficking.

This thesis uses trust and influence theory to analyze how Plan Colombia affects Ecuador and Venezuela and the actions taken by these neighboring countries to reduce, overcome, or exacerbate negative second order effects. Additionally, the thesis offers suggestions on efforts Washington and Bogotá might make to improve and update Plan Colombia, with recommendations to improve U.S. regional strategies.

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For 'Don Celso' and Pablo Sebastián, true examples of resilience and personal achievement.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

That slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but that doesn't excuse blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone with a sharp sword will come along and cut off our arms.

Carl von Clausewitz¹

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States government has two main concerns in South America's Andean Region. The first and more deeply rooted is drug production and trafficking. The second concern is insurgency, conducted by Colombian "terrorist groups" such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).² The U.S. is the current hegemonic world power and exerts influence in Latin American political, economic, and military issues. Two common means of influence are through free-trade agreements and counter-drug operations in the countries of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.³

Despite efforts against drugs and narco-guerilla groups, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that cocaine continues to be "widely available" in the U.S. and that "efforts to combat drugs at the source have only managed to shift coca to new regions and back to old ones."⁴ The Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI), begun in 1989, decreased drug activity in Bolivia and Peru, but

¹ Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in, *Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2007, available from <http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf>, (accessed February 25, 2008), 62.

² U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," (Office of Counterterrorism, Washington D.C., October, 2001), available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm>, (accessed August 23, 2007).

³ U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2007.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, "State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-2005," available from <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

increased it in Ecuador and Colombia, where guerillas became involved in drug trafficking. One outcome of ACI was the movement of crops and laboratories to nearby countries. In 2000, the U.S. began funding Plan Colombia, intended as a coordinated and integrated strategy against illegal groups profiting from drug revenues.⁵

The Colombians' internal conflict has been ongoing for six decades; it is the longest and most violent in the Andean Ridge, hampering Colombia's development and affecting its regional relationships. Violence in Colombia affects neighboring countries. The Colombian government today focuses on defeating drug traffickers and insurgents by eliminating the coca crops and cocaine production that are the main instigators of regional violence.⁶ Plan Colombia, the primarily military strategy implemented by local government, has geopolitical effects on diplomacy, the economy, national security and the population's well-being.⁷ Funded with about five billion dollars over the last seven years by the U.S., Plan Colombia causes unintended negative second-order effects in neighboring countries such as increased border violence, displaced populations and refugees, environmental damage, weapons trading in black markets and drug trafficking. According to Ecuadorian officials, Colombia has made no effort to minimize these negative second-order effects.⁸

The drug market has two sides: supply and demand. To solve the consumption problem, it is also necessary to deal with the demand side, which is a matter for U.S. domestic anti-drug policy. This study focuses on the supply side in the Andean region to determine how Plan Colombia affects neighboring countries, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela.

⁵ Garry Leech, "Plan Colombia: A Closer Look," July 2000, the Information Network of the Americas (INOTA), available from <http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia.htm>, (accessed August 18, 2007).

⁶ Ricardo Meza, "Biowarfare in Colombia: A controversial fumigation scheme," NACLA Report on the America, 2000, 21.

⁷ State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-2005.

⁸ Crisis Group, "Ecuador: Overcoming Instability?," (Latin American Report No. 22, August 2007), available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4976>, (accessed August 25, 2007), 13.

B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

This thesis argues that Plan Colombia is a shortsighted policy initiative that focuses solely on Colombia and has failed to consider the entire Andean region, which faces a transnational threat. Few if any regional dynamics were considered in the Plan Colombia policy. Unanswered concerns include Plan Colombia's effects on neighboring countries and the actions and subsequent reactions from affected neighbors, Washington, and Bogotá. Other concerns include cultural factors that influence U.S. policy and implementation, the Andean external dynamics impacting the plan, and the question of political support from Andean nations. A more cohesive interagency and inter-state approach during the development of the Plan Colombia policy may have offered mitigating solutions to these problems from the start.⁹

The study examines the hypothesis that Plan Colombia has caused unintended negative consequences in neighboring countries due to a poor understanding of regional relationships. Focusing on Ecuador and Venezuela, the thesis uses trust and influence theories to analyze the main interests, perceptions, and misperceptions of affected countries and local populations. As it currently stands, Plan Colombia seems likely to initiate social resistance to American influence in the region, with specific positive and negative impacts likely in Ecuador and Venezuela.

The thesis examines the supply side of the drug trade, with a viewpoint that will not necessarily support the approach taken by policymakers and analysts in Washington and Bogotá over the past few years. Literature related to illicit drugs in the Andean Ridge includes a wide variety of material based on authors' particular interests and political perceptions. The literature appears

⁹ Jeffrey Johnson, A.K. Williams, Johnny Weidmann and Celso Andrade, "Plan Colombia as Interagency Road Map," Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007, 15.

incomplete because it does not include enough information on all Andean actors dealing with drug trafficking as a transnational threat and largely ignores Plan Colombia's second order effects that neighboring countries are undergoing.

Ecuador is a crucial element of U.S. anti-drug efforts in the region. Ecuador hosts one of the U.S. Southern Command's Cooperative Security Location/ Forward Operating Locations (CSL/FOL) in Manta. This CSL/FOL, established in 1999, provides aerial coverage on the eastern Pacific, which has been identified as an important drug-transiting route on the Andean Ridge.¹⁰ According to Congressional testimony, up to 2005, the Manta CSL/FOL has provided information leading to the seizure of \$3.4 billion worth of cocaine.¹¹ Venezuela is also important for anti-drug efforts and the battle against Colombian narco-guerilla groups. These groups, which are Plan Colombia's target, use Venezuelan territory to rest, transit drugs and arms, and procure logistical supplies. Since 2001, when the U.S. Military Liaison Group was expelled from local military headquarters and relocated to the U.S. Embassy compound, the American military has had only limited contact with the Venezuelan military.¹² This situation impedes efforts to improve the continually degrading U.S.-Venezuela relationship.

Success in dealing with the long term and complex drug trafficking conflict requires that U.S. and Colombian decision makers devise a strategy that recognizes previous efforts such as the 1989 Andean Counter-Drug Initiative (ACI), as well as lessons learned from Plan Colombia's seven year history. The thesis argues that the U.S. should consider expanding the parameters of Plan

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Western Hemispheric Region, Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006," (The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006), available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74687.htm>, (accessed May 15, 2007).

¹¹ See General Bantz J. Craddock, "The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to combat terrorism and strengthen stability in Latin America and the Caribbean," Testimony before The 109th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, March, 2005, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html> (accessed August 6, 2007).

¹² Douglas Farah, "A Tutor to Every Army in Latin America, U.S. Expands Latin American Training Role," (Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, July 13, 1998), A01.

Colombia to include Ecuador and Venezuela in order to ensure that gains within Colombia are not undermined by negative actions in the two neighboring countries. If the U.S. does not build a regional political alliance against drugs with other Andean nations, it may see a reverse “domino effect,” in which drugs and associated narco-guerillas take advantage of inconsistent legal retaliation simply by moving from country to country.¹³

C. METHODOLOGY

The thesis research uses trust and influence theory, treating Plan Colombia as a case study for analysis. The research is based on a chronological database of the countries involved in the Plan Colombia military strategy: Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and the U.S. Relevant political, social and military events and data are identified through a review of the literature, as well as interviews and correspondence with policymakers, analysts, academic experts, military commanders, military attachés, journalists, and informed members of civil society from the U.S. and Andean Ridge.¹⁴

The investigation follows these steps. 1) Literature review on the Washington-Bogotá axis, focused on U.S. political, economic, and military influence in the Andean Ridge, Plan Colombia, and its effects on Ecuador and Venezuela. 2) Development of a chronological database beginning in 1989 with the ACI. 3) Interviews and correspondence with individuals knowledgeable about the region. 4) Discussion and analysis of the data through lessons learned. 5) Recommendations.

The study’s intended audience includes faculty members at the Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. and Colombian policy-advisors, Latin American analysts, and Ecuadorian civilian and military officials.

¹³ Johnson et al., 2007.

¹⁴ Inter American Dialogue, “Crisis and Opportunity in the Andean region, The Cases of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela,” available from http://www.thedialogue.org/programs/country/andean_exec.asp (accessed August 21, 2007).

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I introduces U.S. policy in the Andean region, describes the main objectives and gives an overview of the thesis and a description of the methodology used in this study.

Chapter II provides a general explanation of the trust and influence theories that support this study, along with background on the American counter-drug strategies in the Andean Ridge beginning with the failed 1989 ACI. The ACI has since been augmented with the Plan Colombia strategy to undermine the drug cartels and narco-guerillas who supply U.S. markets.

Chapter III presents the history of Plan Colombia and the joint strategy of the U.S. and Colombian governments (what analysts call the "Washington-Bogota axis"). The chapter includes an overview of the main components of the plan and the distribution of funds between soft and hard approaches.

Chapter IV focuses on how Plan Colombia affects Ecuador and Venezuela. These countries have different expectations. Ecuador supports regional counter-drug efforts through the CSL/FOL located in Manta, but is experiencing several of Plan Colombia's negative second order effects. Venezuela's current President, Hugo Chavez, is among the most significant U.S. antagonists. Chavez has expressed some sympathy for the Colombian narco-guerilla groups.

Chapter V highlights some of Plan Colombia's lessons learned for designing, adjusting, and improving U.S. foreign counter-drug policy and strategy.

Chapter VI analyses the data collected from the fieldwork, reviews the hypothesis, and, while recognizing that there is no quick solution for the long-standing drug problem, broadly proposes a regional roadmap by prioritizing soft approach tools with special attention to inter-state relations and presents conclusions and recommendations to improve future counter-drug efforts.

II. TRUST, INFLUENCE, AND THE ANDEAN COUNTER DRUG INITIATIVE

Without some sense of historical continuity, Americans are likely to relearn the lessons of history each time they are faced with a low-intensity conflict. But what is more dangerous is the fact that during the relearning process Americans may suffer casualties and develop policy directions that can only lead to defeat.

Sam C. Sarkesian, 1984¹⁵

A. TRUST AND INFLUENCE

The study uses trust and influence theories to understand how local, state and non-state actors perceive the U.S. presence in the Andean Ridge. This section provides an overview of relevant concepts from these theories.¹⁶

Influence is a crucial concept. In 1959, John R. French and Bertram Raven, the authors of *Bases of Social Power*, state that social power and social influence are found in psychology, sociology, and political science. They claim that “the phenomena of power and influence involve a dyadic relation between two agents which may be viewed from two points of view: (a) What determines the behavior of the agent who exerts power? (b) What determines the reactions of the recipient of this behavior?”¹⁷ Both authors argue that in a particular power relationship, there are variables that define it and consequently it is not limited to any specific source. French and Raven’s idea of social influence and power is that “social influence and power is limited to influence on the person, P, produced by a social agent, O, where O can be either another person, a role, a norm, a

¹⁵ Sam C. Sarkesian, *America’s Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 245.

¹⁶ Colin Williams and Celso Andrade, “Plan Colombia: U.S. Trust and Influence in the Andean Ridge,” Naval Postgraduate School, September 12, 2007.

¹⁷ French, John R. P. and Bertram Raven, *Bases of Social Power*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959), 150.

part of a group. We do not consider social influence exerted on a group.”¹⁸ These authors analyzed the basis that underline the relationship between power (O) and person (P) focusing on those elements that explain why P complies with O’s commands.¹⁹ Thus, social power is the amount of powers that O is capable of because of some more or less enduring relation to P.

In *Managing with Power*, Jeffrey Pfeffer defines power as “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not otherwise do.”²⁰ He explains that “[p]olitics and influence are the processes, the actions, the behaviors through which this potential power is utilized and realized.”²¹ Power, an essential component of strong leadership, is a tool to be seized and wielded by leaders to achieve their goals once they understand the combination of techniques, strategies, tactics, and dynamics that underlie its effective use. Pfeffer affirms that success is measured by results and “morality is rarely relevant.”²² To survive and be successful, people have to play the “political game” and be part of the organizational system.

Pfeffer develops his own “golden rule”: the person with the gold makes the rules and decision. “Being in the right place - a power position - may be the most important factor. Power positions provide control over resources such as budgets and physical facilities, control over access to information, and formal authority.”²³ Various kind of resources, including allies, are vitally important as sources of

¹⁸ French and Raven, 151.

¹⁹ Elegu Jiménez Sandoval, “Understanding Modern Charismatic Leadership: Hugo Chávez and the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ in Contemporary Venezuelan Politics,” Waseda University, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Ph. D. Dissertation, September 2005, 44.

²⁰ Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations*, (Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 30.

²¹ Pfeffer, 30.

²² Ibid.

²³ Cited by John W. Hodge in “Managing with Power, Politics and Influence in Organizations: Book Reviews,” *HR Magazine*, October 1992, available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3495/is_n10_v37/ai_13574906, (accessed January 12, 2008).

power. "Find others with common interests and build long-term relationships with them. Failures in implementation are almost always failures in building coalitions."²⁴ He also states that "to influence others, it is clearly useful to be able to understand them, their interests and attitudes, and how to reach them."²⁵ Pfeffer divides power into seven types, based on the relationships between the actors: 1) reward power; 2) coercive power; 3) legitimate power; 4) expert power; 5) information power; 6) referent power; and, 7) network power.²⁶

1. Reward Power

This refers to the degree to which the individual can give others a reward of some kind such as a positive stroke, some form of compensation, awards, or any symbolic gesture that is seen as a compliment. It depends on power's ability to manipulate positive rewards; its magnitude depends on one's perception of the meaning of the behavior.²⁷

2. Coercive Power

Coercive power deals with people's expectations. People will be punished by power if they do not comply with power's attempts to exercise its will.²⁸ It might refer to verbal and nonverbal put-downs, slights, symbolic gestures of disdain, or actual psychological or physical attack. While reward power increases people's attraction towards power, coercive power builds resentment and resistance by decreasing the attraction felt by people towards power. French and

²⁴ Pfeffer, 69.

²⁵ Ibid., 172.

²⁶ Ibid., 69-77.

²⁷ *Business Horizons*, "Chapter 9. The effective use of power," chapter rewrite, May/June 1986, Foundation for the School of Business at Indiana University, available from http://python.rice.edu/~arb/Courses/610_06_hew_9.pdf, (accessed January 12, 2008), 2.

²⁸ Jimenez Sandoval, 45.

Raven state that “the strength of coercive power depends on the magnitude of the negative valence of the threatened punishment and the perceived probability that person can avoid the punishment by conformity.”²⁹

3. Legitimate power

It is formal authority delegated to the holder of the position. The power relationship originated when people believe that power has a legitimate right to influence their behavior, therefore, feel obligation to accept power’s influence. “Those values range from culturally learned patterns to acceptance of authority as prescribed in a specific system of hierarchy within a given social structure.”³⁰

4. Expert Power

It is an individual's power deriving from knowledge and expertise in a given area as attributed by people. The evaluation made is usually highly specific and limited to the particular area based upon people’s knowledge or on some more general standards. The way expert power is delivered is critical in forming the perceptions of the recipient because it can be seen as an unwanted intrusion in any particular issue and can affect their reciprocal trust.³¹

5. Information Power

This kind of power depends upon access to information that is not public knowledge. Individuals with this type of power are well informed, up-to-date, and have confidence in debating and the ability to persuade others. “Information, along with a sensitivity to its importance, is key to sensible decision making.”³²

²⁹ French and Raven, 157.

³⁰ Jimenez Sandoval, 45.

³¹ Cited by Juan Pablo Davila in “Analyzing *Managing with Power*,” les fiches de lecture de la Chaire D.S.O., 2001, available from <http://www.cnam.fr/lipsor/dso/articles/fiche/pfeffer.html>, (accessed August 23, 2007).

³² Pfeffer, 39.

Information is used to exercise and consolidate power in organizations “by placing your self or your allies in a position to exercise more control over resources and information.”³³

6. Referent Power

Referent power is the identification of people with power. It deals with the charisma and interpersonal skills of the power holder. Good leaders – as power holders - have the ability to attract others and build loyal links. Control over information and resources is an important source of power where followers have particular interests – material or psychological needs – that expand their desire to become or to remain associated with the leader.³⁴ Nationalism and patriotism are also in this category. It is important to highlight that leaders can be good or bad, depending on what parameters (principles as well as cultural values) are used to assess them.

7. Network Power

Pfeffer states that location in a communication network and measuring individual's information power describes the type of influence that one can exert over people. Network power can improve one's interdependence based on individual knowledge and physical location in any network. Working to achieve network centrality is particularly important and a powerful resource for people or groups who would otherwise have little power.³⁵ The effects of such choices on communication centrality, and consequently, on power and influence need to be considered. Knowledge is power, and “one's access to knowledge depends on their location in the communication network.”³⁶

³³ Davila.

³⁴ Pfeffer, 77-78.

³⁵ Ibid., 111-112.

³⁶ Davila.

The U.S. can have a relationship with its Andean partners characterized by one or more of the aforementioned power relationships. The U.S. can certainly use the “carrot” to get Andean countries to do something, demonstrating a reward relationship. However, if reward is not enough to motivate those countries to comply with U.S. wishes, the U.S. might pressure them with the “stick,” or coercion. Context, desired behavior, and level of resistance are significant factors in deciding the power relationship to be applied.

Of the seven possible power relationships between actors, only two can function without trust: coercive and referent. The other relationships require some degree of trust. The concept of trust used in this study is simply that the truster trusts the trusted to do something (expectations) when certain conditions exist. For example, as will be seen in later discussion, the U.S. trusts Colombia to propagate anti-drug rhetoric (expectations) when the U.S. pays to build and staff a radio station (conditions). In this example, the expectations and conditions demonstrate influence based on a relationship of reward, indicated by the construction and staffing of a radio station.³⁷

A leading author on trust, Piotr Sztompka, defines trust as “a bet on the future actions of others.”³⁸ It is important to understand trust between two parties because this concept may help explain the nature of the power relationship. Sztompka offers a synthetic treatment of trust as a cultural resource necessary for viable functioning of society. The importance of trust derives from some fundamental qualities of human action. When interacting with others, people must constantly articulate expectations about their future actions. People behave according to their anticipation of how other people will act, committing themselves to actions with at least partly uncertain and unpredictable consequences.³⁹

³⁷ Williams and Andrade, 7.

³⁸ Piotr Sztompka, *Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25.

³⁹ Sztompka, 20.

Sztompka suggests that trust has become an increasingly salient issue because individuals are actively required to face an ever more complex and uncertain world.⁴⁰ He stresses that trust is “intimately related to risk”⁴¹ and makes a useful distinction between primary and secondary targets of trust.⁴² Primary and secondary targets can be individuals as well as roles, groups, organizations, institutions, systems, or societies; however, trust always relates to persons, so that the logic of primordial, personal, trust is behind all types of trust.⁴³ Sztompka explains that congruence between expectations and roles is a crucial element in the placement of trust. Thus, the discussion again moves swiftly into the area of controlling or reducing the risk of misplaced trust. Above all, the decision to trust rests on an evaluation of the relationship with potential trustees. The rational calculation is modified, according to Sztompka, by the truster's psychological “trusting impulse” and cultural “rules of trust.”⁴⁴

Senior decision makers' main objective should be to earn the Colombian trust and confidence and to convince peasants that their personal and national interests resided with the government efforts, not with the insurgents. “There is a direct correlation between credibility and the ability to demonstrably improve the quality of life, physical security, and stability in a society.”⁴⁵ This notion implies that an information operations plan has to be developed and closely monitored by the IO specialists. Trust and influence have to be well maintained by developing a structure and mechanisms to systematically synchronize the IO throughout different institutions. U.S. agencies must increase, as fast as possible, their understanding of local culture in order to be culturally sensitive.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Sztompka, 11.

⁴¹ Ibid., 29.

⁴² Ibid., 46.

⁴³ Ibid., 41.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 52-56.

⁴⁵ Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 9.

⁴⁶ Baker, 20 -21.

Trust and influence can be lost because of a lack of coordination and synchronization and by disseminating contradictory information. Sztompka also states that individuals and societies only benefit from trust, if it is neither misplaced nor used for unethical purposes. Trust and influence serve organizations because it makes it possible for them to reach their goals. It is important to highlight that cultural misperception could lead to a failure in the entire mission. Thus, reliable actions supported by targeted communications to specific audiences lead to success. Planners must always keep in mind that government institutions are competing for influence with counter-government groups and therefore require that an effective IO plan be developed along with a maneuver plan.⁴⁷ Therefore, the ability of a state to generate interpersonal trust may rest largely on the trustworthiness of the state itself, which means that decision-making, policies, and implementation procedures are considered fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory; hence, the polity will feel sheltered and will attempt to be more cooperative.⁴⁸

B. THE ANDEAN COUNTER DRUG INITIATIVE

In the last three decades, illegal drug use in the U.S. has become an issue of health, criminal justice, and foreign policy. Fighting drug use in U.S. society has most frequently involved punitive strategies. The U.S. has one of the world's highest rates of incarceration for illegal drug use.⁴⁹ Internationally, drug policy has become a cornerstone of the U.S. relationship with other countries. The "War on Drugs" began in 1988 when President Ronald Reagan created the Office of National Drug Control Policy for central coordination of drug-related legislative,

⁴⁷ Sztompka, 69-74.

⁴⁸ Margaret Levi, "The State of the Study of the State," Department of Political Science, University of Washington, December 2000, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, available from <http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/levi.doc>, (accessed August 17, 2007).

⁴⁹ Dave Bewley-Taylor, Mike Trace and Alex Stevens, "Incarceration of drug offenders: costs and impacts," The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Program, 2005, available from http://www.internationaldrugpolicy.net/reports/BeckleyFoundation_BriefingPaper_07.pdf, (accessed November 9, 2007), 3.

security, diplomatic, research and health policy throughout the government. Since then, over \$25 billion has been spent annually on controlling drugs internationally, making this war one of the largest annual recipients of U.S. government overseas funding.⁵⁰ In the 1990s, Washington averaged \$57.7 billion annually on "law enforcement, interdiction, educational, rehabilitation, and health-related programs designed to stem the flow of heroin and cocaine and manage their effects."⁵¹

In 1989, the first Bush administration began providing an average of \$700 million annually to the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. The ACI's initial purpose was to reduce the impact of the illegal drug trade in America by reducing illicit drug crop cultivation and trafficking.⁵² Beginning in 1989 with the Counter-drug Initiative, U.S. interagency funds, support and personnel have played a leading role in anti-drug operations in the Andean Ridge. The purpose of the ACI is to reduce "illicit drug crop cultivation and trafficking through a combination of intense and consistent eradication, interdiction, organization attack, and alternative development in key source and transit countries to reduce the impact of the illegal drug trade in the hemisphere."⁵³ Since 1989, the U.S. military has played a strong role in the drug war. The National Defense Authorization Act essentially made the military the "single lead agency" detecting and monitoring

⁵⁰ Linda Farthing, "The Drug War in the Andes," Ithaca, New York, March 2006, available from <http://ain-bolivia.org/drugwarCompleteLF.doc>, (accessed September 16, 2007).

⁵¹ Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability*, (RAND, 2001), 19.

⁵² "The Andean Counter-drug Initiative Assessment," Office of the President of the United States, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10002210.2004.html>, (accessed September 16, 2007).

⁵³ Ibid.

drugs entering the U.S.⁵⁴ Most military aid and training for foreign countries in past years has come from funds designated for Drug War programs, including the ACI and Plan Colombia.

In 1997, the Clinton administration passed a Presidential Directive (PDD) and National Security Decision Directive (NSPD) to increase awareness that “effective responses to [drug trafficking] may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency operations.”⁵⁵ In 1999, Clinton agreed to support the new Colombian government’s strategy against the drug industry, Plan Colombia, by funding it with \$1.3 billion. However, by 2002, the second Bush administration assessed that U.S. decision makers “have to develop an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs.”⁵⁶ In essence, the desired outcomes of Plan Colombia have not been achieved.

The data on U.S. funding of Andean anti-drug efforts between 2000 and 2007 shows big differences between what Colombia receives (75 percent of the total) and what other Andean countries receive. Ecuador receives 2.5 percent and Venezuela only .5 percent.⁵⁷ (See Table 1 and Figure 1).

⁵⁴ Glen Segell, “The Narcotics War and Civil-Military Relations,” International Studies Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, March 2000, available from <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/seg03/>, (accessed October 21, 2007).

⁵⁵ William J. Clinton, “Presidential Decision Directive,” Federation of American Scientists, 1997, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>, (accessed July 20, 2007).

⁵⁶ The Office of the President of the United States, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002,” available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss4.html>, (accessed July 20, 2007).

⁵⁷ At this point, second order effects are not qualified as positive or negative because Ecuador and Venezuela, as sovereign states, have different approaches and perceptions.

U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries (\$7144.59)

FY2000 – FY2007

(in millions \$)

FY	Colombia	Peru	Bolivia	Ecuador	Venezuela
2000	1124.50	80.50	158.50	21.70	4.60
2001	239.20	48.50	52.70	2.80	1.60
2002	525.20	143.00	90.30	25.60	5.50
2003	766.80	129.70	93.50	32.50	2.80
2004	706.30	116.00	95.60	35.00	5.00
2005	767.80	115.40	90.30	25.80	2.98
2006	682.95	106.92	79.20	19.80	2.23
2007	556.07	103.24	66.08	17.38	1.04
Sub Total	5368.82	843.26	726.18	180.58	25.75
%	75.15%	11.80%	10.16%	2.53%	0.36%

Table 1. U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Andean Countries 2000-2007⁵⁸




Figure 1. U.S. Counter Narcotics Assistance to Andean Countries 2000-2007⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Connie Veillette, "Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2007 Assistance," Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS Report for Congress, Based on data from the U.S. State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2002-2007, P.L. 110-5, August 30, 2007, available from <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8778:1>, (accessed September 16, 2007), 7-12.

⁵⁹ Veillette, 7-12.

Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, for example, have not received U.S. funding for military training and education because these countries, as part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), did not sign the Article 98 agreement in accordance with the American Service Members' Protection Act (ASPA). The Article 98 provision excludes U.S. service members from prosecution under the ICC. Because Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela have not signed, U.S. decision makers have withheld funds from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to punish them. The decision to withhold funding was made despite the fact that it may produce, in the words of U.S. General Banz J. Craddock, "negative effects on long-term U.S. security interests in the Western Hemisphere and unintended consequence of restricting U.S. access to and interaction with many important partner nations."⁶⁰ Perhaps only coincidentally, most democratic and American-allied countries in the region are governed by leftist politicians who sometimes oppose Washington's regional policies and strategies. A similar political consequence may follow from the Andean Counter-drug Initiative and its complementary strategy, Plan Colombia.

During the 1990's, successful drug crop eradication in Bolivia and Peru led to a huge expansion of coca leaf production and opium poppy cultivation in Colombia. The shifts in the location of coca cultivation meant that overall production in the Andean region has remained constant since the beginning of the 1990's.⁶¹ (See Figure 2) At the same time, guerilla groups active in coca growing areas, such as the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC, began financing their

⁶⁰ Craddock, "The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to combat terrorism and strengthen stability in Latin America and the Caribbean," Testimony before the 109th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2005, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html>, (accessed August 6, 2007).

⁶¹ U.S. State Department, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports 1996-2005," available from <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/>, (accessed September 16, 2007).

activities with drug industry income, and these groups grew rapidly with the increased income. Official Colombian sources estimate that about half of guerilla groups' income comes from the drug trade.⁶²




Figure 2. U.S. Government Estimate of Andean Coca Cultivation⁶³

According to the State Department International Narcotics Strategy Report, “[S]ince 1989 the coca cultivation in the region has declined a mere 16 percent, as relatively large reductions in production in Peru and Bolivia have been paralleled by increased cultivation in Colombia.”⁶⁴ In April 2001, Bush announced a new Andean Counter-drug Initiative. The new program increases

⁶² Roger F. Noriega, “U.S. Policy and Programs in Colombia,” Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 2004, available from <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040617nori.htm>, (accessed August 20, 2007).

⁶³ U.S. State Department, “Foreign Military Financing, 2005-2007,” 2007.

⁶⁴ The Free Library, *Andean Regional Initiative: A Policy Fated to Fail*, Volume 6, Number 29, July 2001, available from <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Regional+Initiative%3a+A+Policy+Fated+to+Fail.-a077806344>, (accessed September 12, 2007).

the involvement of the U.S. military in the region.⁶⁵ This new initiative takes the same approach as the 1989 Initiative, prioritizing military hardware and training for the Andean military and police forces to combat drugs.

Figure 3 suggests that the new ACI, like the original plan, is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the production and trafficking of drugs.




Figure 3. ACI's outcome, Andean cultivation 1990-2006⁶⁶

As Edward J. Rougemont notes, “[T]he production of drugs in the region has remained constant and the flow of drugs to U.S. markets has continued.”⁶⁷ In addition, U.S. support for relatively unsuccessful eradication programs angers rural communities and presents threats to human health and the environment.⁶⁸ Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives agreed in 2005 that the

⁶⁵ Farthing, 36.

⁶⁶ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2007*, available from [www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf, (accessed September 16, 2007), 13.

⁶⁷ Edward J. Rougemont, *Drug Legalization and the Impact of Drugs on Hemispheric Security*, (Inter-American Defense College Department Of Studies, Class XLII, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., April 2003), 28.

⁶⁸ Mario Murillo and Jesus Rey Avirama, *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization*, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003, 129-130.

ACI “has failed as an anti-drug policy, it has failed as a human rights policy, and it has failed to have any impact at all in reducing the availability, price or purity of drugs in the streets of America.”⁶⁹ Representatives noted in 2005 that “illegal drugs are cheaper today than they were six years ago and \$4 billion ago.” (See Figure 4) A 2001 Rand Corporation study, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* predicts that “every dollar the U.S. spent trying to wipe out coca in remote areas of Colombia would be 23 times more effective, if the U.S. spent it at home on drug treatment, prevention, and education and on local law enforcement.”⁷⁰




Figure 4. U.S. Overseas Drug Control Spending vs. Cocaine and Heroin Prices⁷¹

⁶⁹ Colombia Debate in the House of Representatives, "The McGovern-McCollum-Moore amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill proposed to cut military spending to Colombia by \$100 million," June 28, 2005, available from http://www.lawg.org/docs/colombia_debate_6_28_05.pdf, (accessed September 12, 2007), 2.

⁷⁰ Colombia Debate in the House of Representatives, 2005, 2.

⁷¹ "Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007," Latin America Working Group, Based on data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), March 2007, available from <http://www.lawg.org/misc/Publications.htm>, (accessed September 16, 2007), 6.

The nature of counter drug programs in the Andean region is important for understanding the lack of long-term results. U.S. counter drug programs - ACI and Plan Colombia - in Colombia involve two major, and controversial, procedures. The first is eradication through herbicide spraying, which destroys legitimate crops and the environment along with coca, and has met resistance by local state governments and peasants. The second is interdiction through investment of billions of dollars for military hardware and training for Colombian security forces sometimes linked to human rights violations.⁷²

The global cocaine market is basically stable in terms of both supply and demand. Figures presented above indicate that the supply side of the market is adaptive. The success in the reduction of coca cultivation from 2000 to 2006 did not lead to a notable decline in cocaine production, as shown in the 2007 *United Nations World Drug Report*: 1,008 metric tons in 2004, 980 in 2005, and 984 in 2006. With stable production, interdiction efforts have not met planners' expectations.⁷³ The White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimated that "cocaine's street price in the U.S. was about 20 percent lower in July 2006 than it had been in July 2003."⁷⁴ Moreover, in early 2007, the Latin American Working Group reported that "despite the large and growing outlays for crop eradication and drug interdiction operations, cocaine and heroin prices have continued to fall, and remain at near their all-time lows."⁷⁵

This thesis argues that the U.S. should refocus its resources, in order to "[avoid] short term victory with no lasting effect." A two-pronged approach would link the supply side in the Andean Ridge (offering strong support for enforcement and alternative development programs and democratic institutions) and the

⁷² Farthing, 2006, 74.

⁷³ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *World Drug Report 2007*, (United Nations Publication), available from www.unodc.org, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf, (accessed September 16, 2007), 12.

⁷⁴ John P. Walters, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Report on Progress in Colombia: Briefing to Foreign Press Center," November 17, 2005. Cited in "Below the Radar," 6.

⁷⁵ "Below the Radar," 6.

demand side (with a comprehensive anti-drug strategy of prevention education and rehabilitation in the U.S.).⁷⁶ As the RAND Corporation study notes, victory in the war against drugs requires a unified and multilateral effort in the Western hemisphere, one based on mutual trust.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ "Andean Counterdrug Initiative," reprint of the speech presented to the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002, available from <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Andean+Counterdrug+Initiative.-a098543780>, (accessed September 12, 2007).

⁷⁷ Rabasa and Chalk, 79-82.

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III. PLAN COLOMBIA, THE WASHINGTON-BOGOTÁ AXIS

Forces that cannot win will not deter.

Gen Nathan F. Twining⁷⁸

A. INTRODUCTION

Colombia is Latin America's oldest formal democracy and a major U.S. partner in the fight against international narcotics trafficking and terrorism. With a territory about the same size as Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, Colombia supplies more than 80 percent of the cocaine and nearly 70 percent of the heroin in the U.S.⁷⁹

Plan Colombia, proposed in 1999, is the ACI program devoted to Colombia. To implement the \$7.5 billion program, Colombia asked for \$3.5 billion from the international community to supplement \$4 billion of its own resources. At first, President Clinton funded the plan with a \$1.3 billion U.S. interagency assistance package aimed at "curbing violence in Colombia and drug abuse in the U.S."⁸⁰ Eighty percent of the assistance package went for "hard-side" military issues, such as counter-narcotics and counterterrorism, and the remaining 20 percent to complementary "soft-side" matters like fostering peace, strengthening democracy and social institutions, judicial reform, alternative development, refugee assistance and human rights.

Considered within the framework of trust and influence, the U.S. government trusted that Plan Colombia would reduce the availability of narcotics

⁷⁸ Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in, *Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2007, available from <http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf>, (accessed February 25, 2008), 83.

⁷⁹ Tina Rosenberg, "The Great Cocaine Quagmire: Can Bush Resist Expanding Clinton's Colombian Drug War?" *Rolling Stone*, 2001, 51.

⁸⁰ Rosenberg, 52.

in U.S. markets when the government implemented support for the plan. The influence of the U.S. in the region increased. After the Congress authorized expanded support for Colombia's fight against drugs, narcotics trafficking and terrorist organizations, the American Embassy in Colombia became one of the world's largest diplomatic missions.⁸¹ The embassy symbolizes wealth, power and U.S. influence.

The main effort of Plan Colombia was only a temporary success story; however, large amounts of coca were eradicated in the early years of the program and trafficking routes were successfully interdicted. Arrests and extraditions of drug traffickers dramatically increased. There was an increase in the street price of cocaine and a decrease in the purity of the product, so effectively drug distribution was curtailed. Successes were primarily due to men and women on the ground destroying crops, interdicting smuggling routes, and making arrests. However, after 2002 drug traffickers came up with different and creative shipment options and the cocaine trend in the U.S. market once again tended to "stabilize" by itself.⁸² (See Figure 4)

Concepts of trust and influence help explain why Plan Colombia's success was only temporary. The U.S. influenced the Colombian government to address the issue of drugs that come to the United States. Pfeffer's framework fits because the Colombian people resisted the request for local support, as U.S. drug use was not a problem for the Colombian people. The U.S. subsequently influenced the Colombian government to deal with an issue the peasants in the countryside would rather not address. However, participants in Plan Colombia could not sustain their actions because their expectations went unmet. Farmers trusted Plan Colombia to provide them with alternate crops when they eradicated the coca. The farmers further trusted the Colombian government to satisfy basic needs and protect them from the drug cartels when the farmers supported Plan

⁸¹ Peter Clark, "Failed 'Plan' in Colombia," (July 31, 2000), available from <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20030818/clark>, (accessed May 16, 2007).

⁸² "Below the Radar," 6.

Colombia. Unfortunately, Plan Colombia, the U.S., and the Colombian government could not meet the farmers' expectations. Suffering from their lack of money, most farmers returned to coca farming.

B. MAIN COMPONENTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA

Table 2 presents the five main components of U.S. Interagency Assistance for Plan Colombia and appropriations for FY 2000.

Program	Appropriation (in millions of dollars)	Main Components	Main U.S. Agencies Involved
Boost governing capacity	\$122.0	Support for Human Rights and Judicial Reform. Support for a broad range of human rights, peace process, and programs to strengthen democracy, judicial reform and the rule of law in Colombia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DoJ (Department of Justice) - DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) - Treasury Department
"Push into southern Colombia"	\$441.9	Expansion of Counter-Narcotics Operations into Southern Colombia to help the government gain control of drug producing regions. Includes helping persons displaced by conflict (Colombia has the world's fourth-largest population of internally displaced persons) and technical assistance to farmers in southern Colombia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DoS (Department of State) - DoD (Department of Defense) - DEA - NAS (Narcotics Affairs Section)
Alternative economic development	\$174.0	Alternative Economic Development to help small farmers growing coca and opium poppies make the transition to legal economic activity as interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less profitable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) - Treasury Department
Drug trafficking interdiction	\$465.6	Increased Interdiction to enhance U.S. and Colombian narcotics interdiction efforts and to fund interdiction programs in the Caribbean and in Central and South America, including Bolivia and Ecuador.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DoD - Treasury Department - U.S. Customs - DEA - NAS
Colombian National Police support	\$115.6	Assistance for the Colombian National Police (CNP) , including helicopters, weapons, equipment, and training.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DoD - DEA
Total	\$1,319.1		

Table 2. U.S. Interagency Assistance for Plan Colombia (FY2000)⁸³

⁸³ U.S. State Department, "U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia," Military Appropriations, 2001.

To bolster domestic support for the policy initiative in 2002, the Bush administration linked problems in Colombia to a narco-terrorist nexus, and used the threat to justify continuation of the Clinton's policy. Note in Table 2 that the "Alternative Economic Development" program received less than 20 percent of the aid. Table 3 shows how 80 percent of U.S. aid is distributed to "hard side" issues and 20 percent to "soft side" issues.

Military and Police Assistance Programs (millions of dollars; numbers <i>underlined and italicized</i> are estimates taken by averaging previous two years)												
	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007, estimate	2008, request
Subtotal	86.6	114.3	306.6	743.6	238.8	400.7	624.0	555.6	642.5	601.6	624.3	611.8
Percentage of total	100%	99.6%	97.2%	76.3%	99.4%	77.6%	82.0%	80.5%	82.7%	82.0%	82.5%	81.4%
Economic and Social Assistance Programs (millions of dollars)												
Subtotal	0	0.5	8.8	231.4	1.4	115.5	136.7	134.5	134.7	132.2	132.2	139.5
Percentage of total	0%	0.4%	2.8%	23.7%	0.6%	22.4%	18.0%	19.5%	17.3%	18.0%	17.5%	18.6%
Grand Total	86.6	114.8	315.4	975.0	240.2	516.2	760.7	690.1	777.2	733.8	756.5	751.3

Table 3. U.S. Interagency Aid to Colombia since 1997: Summary Tables⁸⁴

According to analysts, recent evidence shows that Plan Colombia's claims of success are wrong or irrelevant. They claim that the program is not only a "waste of time and money"⁸⁵ but has also produced highly undesirable side effects including violence along common borders, displaced people and refugees, environmental damage, black markets weapons trade and drug trafficking. Furthermore, in terms of U.S. domestic politics, "neither the President

⁸⁴ U.S. State Department, "Foreign Military Financing 2005-07: U.S., FY 2007," International Affairs, Budget Request Summary and Highlights, Washington, February 2006, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2007/>, (accessed May 16, 2007).

⁸⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Plan Colombia: Washington's Latest Drug War Failure," Defense and Foreign Studies, Cato Institute, July 27, 2001, available from http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3949, 2001, (accessed August 16, 2007).

nor the Secretary of State have given the American people any coherent explanation of what is at stake in Colombia or of how massive military assistance can do anything but make matters worse.”⁸⁶

C. THE WASHINGTON – BOGOTÁ JOINT STRATEGY

Colombia is home to as many as 30,000 "well-armed, drug-financed terrorists.”⁸⁷ The U.S., by funding counter-drug and counter terrorism policies, is involved in an internal Colombian conflict. Analysts in the Andean Ridge call the relationship between the U.S. and Colombia the “Washington-Bogotá axis.” Its purpose is to unify the two countries' ideas, efforts, and objectives. For the U.S., the objective is to fight narco-traffic and for Colombia, the objective is to find a lasting resolution of its internal conflict. This section summarizes how the Washington-Bogotá joint strategy serves their common interests.⁸⁸

First, the U.S. maintains lines of communication, shares resources, exchanges information and new ideas, provides positive and negative feedback in a bottom up, top down, bilateral, and multilateral flow, and promotes Colombian institutions that embrace the idea of a joint effort to reduce illegal activities. To expand counter narcotics and counter insurgent groups operations, the U.S. provides advice, assistance, training, equipment, and intelligence to support the Colombian government's objectives to locate, interdict, and isolate resources; freeze, confiscate, and close accounts both in Colombia and globally; and gain control of the drug producing regions.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Robert White, “El Salvador's lessons unlearned, heading for trouble in Colombia,” Center for International Policy, Washington, available from <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD>, (accessed August 18, 2007).

⁸⁷ Noriega.

⁸⁸ Fredy Rivera Velez, “Ecuador: Untangling the Drug War” in Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 258.

⁸⁹ International Herald Tribune, “Andean coca spat exposes growing rift over Washington's drug war,” December 22, 2006, available from http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2006/12/22/america/LA_GEN_South_America_US_Coca_Spat.php, (accessed January 12, 2008).

Second, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Special Operations Forces have conducted specialized training exercises with every army in the Andean region, often avoiding effective civilian oversight or Congressional restrictions that apply to other military operations abroad.⁹⁰ The U.S. provides Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), training and equipment to Latin America.⁹¹ Building on the U.S. ATA, Colombia is improving its counter terrorism capabilities and strengthening its political will to combat terrorism in its own country.

Third, the U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program helps foreign nations defend against existing or potential internal threats. According to SOUTHCOM, "while anti-drug operations are a sustained focus of the SOF effort in Latin America, the priority mission is military-to-military engagement."⁹² Section 2011 of Title 10 governs SOF training with foreign militaries; it is widely applied in Colombia, where SOF forces participate mainly in counter narcotics operations, training and intelligence gathering. The SOF mission is oriented to avoid having "ungoverned areas" become sanctuaries for insurgents and drug traffickers.⁹³

Fourth, the U.S. Congress has authorized funds for training, security and infrastructure essential for Colombian legal system, judges, prosecutors, politicians and witnesses. Extradition to the U.S. is still the sanction that drug criminals fear most and public acceptance of this measure is increasing.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Farah, 1998, A01.

⁹¹ Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America: Terrorism Issues," Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS Report for the Congress, January 2007, available from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

⁹² Dana Priest, "U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops," *Washington Post*, July 12, 1998, A01, available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas> (accessed August 12, 2007).

⁹³ Linda Robinson in "Special Forces in Colombia, South America," *U.S. News & World Report*, 2007 and in her book *Master of Chaos* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004).

⁹⁴ Aldo Civico, "Rethinking U.S.-Colombia Policy, The U.S. and Colombia Can Break Cycles of Violence and Repression," May 2007, available from www.americanprogress.org, (accessed August 20, 2007).

Colombia exchanges information with U.S. law enforcement agencies and is working to overcome several weaknesses in its own court system.⁹⁵

Fifth, the Washington-Bogota axis works to disrupt terrorists' financial infrastructures, specifically formal and underground methods for cross-border funds transfers through banks, businesses, financial companies, currency exchangers, and NGOs that channel funds for terrorist groups.⁹⁶ Working with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Colombia has established a prototype Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) that examines anomalies in trade data for signs of customs fraud and trade-based money laundering.⁹⁷ The Treasury Department has also set up a Terrorist Tracking Task Force (TTTF) to work with foreign governments to block terrorists' access to funds.⁹⁸

Sixth, the U.S. has been funding Plan Colombia since 2000. In August 2002, Congress passed Public Law 107-206 allowing Colombia to use U.S. aid for counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency as well as counter-narcotics purposes.⁹⁹ According to the Latin America Working Group, between 1997 and 2007, Colombia's police and military will have received "almost exactly two out of every three dollars of U.S. security assistance for the entire region. Thanks to Plan Colombia, aid to Colombia today is about six times what it was in 1997."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Virginia M. Bouvier, "Evaluating U.S. Policy in Colombia," May 2005, available from <http://americas.irc-online.org/reports/2005/0505colombia.html>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

⁹⁶ "National Drug Control Strategy," Office of the President of the United States, FY 2004, Budget Summary, ONDCP, February 2003, available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/budget2002.pdf>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

⁹⁷ Crisis Group, "Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects," (Latin America Report N°14, Quito/Brussels, June 2005), available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3515>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

⁹⁸ Martin J. Manning, "Terrorist Organizations, Freezing of Assets," *Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security*, 2004, available from <http://www.espionageinfo.com/Te-Uk/Terrorist-Organizations-Freezing-of-Assets.html>, (accessed August 20, 2007).

⁹⁹ Kurata, 2004.

¹⁰⁰ "Below the Radar," 3.

D. PLAN COLOMBIA: INTER STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

With globalization and the expansion of technology, physical boundaries among "sovereign" territories are affected by the new, more competitive global economic system. However, emerging states like those in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility are unlikely to compete given their lack of political culture, technology and capital. This makes some developed countries dominant over others where interests overcome interstate friendships.¹⁰¹ According to the current SOUTHCOM Commander, Admiral James G. Stavridis, the U.S. is "fortunate to have as neighbors democracies that virtually all share similar values; unfortunately, poverty, inequality, and security challenges all contribute to a growing, frustrated expectation from the people for dramatic change."¹⁰² He notes that SOUTHCOM's mission to achieve regional cooperation is made more difficult by antagonistic political leaders who attempt to spread anti-U.S. views.

Having reviewed the critical features of influence and trust, this analysis turns to U.S. policy in the era of globalization when U.S. actions increasingly influence the Colombian government and might gain the same influence with other Andean partners. Audrey Cronin argues that contemporary transnational terrorism and organized crime require "four levels of analysis, the individual, the organization, the state, and the international system because these four analytical 'lenses' provide clarity and intellectual coherence to what is in reality a complex and intricately intertwined series of actors."¹⁰³ Thomas Friedman suggests that globalization transcends territorial, socioeconomic, and political borders via a system of networks and relationships. He affirms that globalization can also influence actors on its "dark side." Because states are no longer the

¹⁰¹ Daniel J. Elazar, "The Rise and Fall of the Modern State System," available from <http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles/risefall-state.htm>, (accessed November 20, 2007).

¹⁰² SOUTHCOM, "Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis," Armed Services Committees, United States Southern Command before the 110th Congress, March 2007, 7.

¹⁰³ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Sources of Contemporary Terrorism," in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism*, Georgetown University Press, 2004, 19.

only actors on the world stage, globalization shows that the world is more integrated.¹⁰⁴ State and non-state actors that resist the new world system will be left behind.¹⁰⁵

Moises Naim asserts that governments, including the Andean governments, currently face five wars on the “dark side” of globalization: drug and arms trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering and intellectual property issues.¹⁰⁶ In this regard, two important developments affect the security of all nations. First, the scope of primary actors in the international system is more complex and varied than a system containing only states. In addition, capitalism has become the major macroeconomic system, resulting in increased economic integration and, by extension, security integration.¹⁰⁷

These developments converge, with two implications in the Andes. First, globalization limits the effectiveness of the Colombian state in unilaterally shaping its own border security practices against transnational threats. Second, Colombian transnational threats (narco-guerillas, terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime) are a greater concern than other issues and require a shared solution. This may seem to overemphasize the effects of globalization and downplay the fact that states remain major players in both internal and external affairs. However, if integration becomes the norm, integrated and cooperative approaches to national security are essential.¹⁰⁸

The 2006 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) identified two pillars of U.S. strategy. One pillar is to promote “effective democracies, and to

¹⁰⁴ R. Gilpin, “The Second Great Age of Capitalism,” in *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15–20.

¹⁰⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, *The New System* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) 102-103.

¹⁰⁶ Moises Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” *Foreign Policy* 134, January - February 2003, 28.

¹⁰⁷ Friedman, 69.

¹⁰⁸ Dashdavaa Dashtseren, “Border Protection and National Security of Mongolia,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 2006, 9.

extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise developmental policies.”¹⁰⁹ The second pillar is to lead the fight by “a growing community of democracies” against “pandemic disease, [the threat of] terrorism, human trafficking, and natural disasters.”¹¹⁰ The NSS includes chapters on strengthening alliances and cooperative networks to prevent attack, diffusing regional conflict, igniting global economic growth, expanding development, building democratic infrastructure, and developing joint agendas to accomplish these objectives. In this view, USSOUTHCOM’s strategy in the Andean Ridge intended to promote regional security and stability in supporting democracies by fighting Plan Colombia’s transnational threats. Regional cooperative security is accomplished by activities that develop cooperative arrangements, trust building, and confidence building measures to reduce inter-state and regional tensions.¹¹¹

Ideally, Plan Colombia is appropriate for a successful cooperative network, because representatives from various U.S. departments and agencies are linked with their Colombian counterparts.¹¹² However, while representation at the national and tactical levels is sufficient, U.S. representation is thin at the regional level.¹¹³ While it is clear that the Washington-Bogotá strategy requires cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia, for getting better outcomes, this strategy should be executed within a larger multi-national coalition, giving priority to the “soft approach” in order to address the majority of social problems – need for crop substitution and alternative income opportunities – that would result from

¹⁰⁹ “The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006,” Office of the President of the United States, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, (accessed August 21, 2007), 3.

¹¹⁰ “The National Security Strategy of the United States 2006,” 3.

¹¹¹ USSOUTHCOM Homepage, “USSOUTHCOM’s Theater Strategy,” March 5, 2003 [database online]; available at: <http://www.USSOUTHCOM.mil/pa/Facts/Strategy.htm>, (accessed October 20, 2007).

¹¹² Johnson et al., 2007.

¹¹³ Rand Beers, “Statement of Rand Beers, assistant secretary of state for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, September 21, 2000,” Center for International Policy, Washington D.C., available from <http://ciponline.org/colombia>, (accessed August 25, 2007).

the eradication of narco-guerillas. This approach would improve on the current “hard approach” strategy which, giving the previous analysis in this thesis, is not yielding long-term results.

A recent essay by Martin Gorman and Alex Krongard suggests that “a fundamental mismatch exists between the international threat environment and the current national security structure that undermines the ability of the U.S. to develop appropriate policies and implement comprehensive strategies.”¹¹⁴ Others, however, submit that the U.S. has successfully executed extremely complex regional development initiatives and point to Plan Colombia as one such example. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. What is certain is that U.S. influence in South America met resistance when “neighboring countries began to feel the effects of violence in Colombia as the armed conflict took on an increasing regional dimension.”¹¹⁵

Discomfort and opposition to U.S. military presence is “inevitably tied to the unilateral nature of Washington’s military policy, including the war in Iraq and attempts to exempt U.S. soldiers from jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).”¹¹⁶ The presence of so many personnel on military missions sends a message that the U.S. prefers force over diplomacy to settle supply side problems. Nonetheless, when dealing with social problems, it is important to keep in mind that soft approach measures work better than hard approach strategies.¹¹⁷

Ecuador and Venezuela are particularly vulnerable to spillover from Colombia’s conflict. Narco traffickers and the three Colombian illegal armed

¹¹⁴ Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard, “Goldwater-Nichols for the Interagency Process,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (JFQ), no. 39, October 2005, 52.

¹¹⁵ Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani and Phillip McLean, “Back from the Brink, “Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999–2007,” *The Americas Program Center for Strategic and International Studies*, CSIS, November 2007, 8.

¹¹⁶ John Lindsay-Poland, “U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean,” in Catherine Lutz, ed., *Empire and Global Response* (Washington D.C., Pluto Press, 2004), 8.

¹¹⁷ Lindsay-Poland, 10.

groups already use the vast border regions for operations. This endangers Colombia's neighbors, who are concerned about the weakening of the Colombian state.¹¹⁸

The largest seizures of cocaine in 2005 were made by Colombia, the U.S., Venezuela, Spain, Ecuador, and Mexico in that order.¹¹⁹ However, as Table 4 shows, there are no signs of large-scale coca cultivation outside Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.¹²⁰

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Bolivia	1,100	5,493	7,512	7,000	11,620	15,353	7,653	9,395	11,839	10,089	8,437	6,073	5,070
Colombia	4,904	25,402	22,576	44,123	69,155	44,158	61,568	95,897	153,126	137,033	142,786	170,752	213,371
Peru	-	-	1,259	3,462	7,834	14,733	6,208	6,436	7,134	11,312	10,399	12,237	12,688
Ecuador	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-
Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118	40	0

Table 4. Reported cumulative eradication of coca bush (hectares) in the Andean Ridge, 1994 – 2006¹²¹

This chapter has reviewed the link between the U.S. and Colombia and the need for a regional response when dealing with transnational threats in the era of globalization, when technology, capitalism and other improvements have

¹¹⁸ Daniel W. Christman, John G. Heimann and Julia E. Sweig, *Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region*, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, 2004, 3.

¹¹⁹ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007 World Drug Report, 2007, 12, 63.

¹²⁰ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007 World Drug Report, 65.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 69.

disrupted old barriers. The next chapter examines what the Colombian crisis has meant to Ecuador and Venezuela. The conflict in Colombia poses an undeniable regional threat, mostly visibly in the form of increased refugee flow, increased drug cultivation, and increased levels of violence from illegal cross border movement.

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IV. REGIONAL IMPACTS: ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA

When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in increasingly larger concentric circles around your own desk.

Gen Bruce C. Clarke¹²²

A. EFFECTS OF DRUGS AND PLAN COLOMBIA ON THE ANDEAN ENVIRONMENT

With the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. redefined its rationale for military engagements in Latin America with a focus on counter-narcotics missions. However, “unconventional adversaries are difficult to respond to in a discriminate and proportionate manner and the U.S. ability to carry out coercive actions has been shown to be less effective.”¹²³ Nowadays, the U.S. does not have a vastly superior capability to use against unconventional threats. As Colin Gray notes, “there is a traditional American way of war and its features do not favor the strengths required to succeed against irregulars. [Furthermore,] American military culture has proved resistant to making radical adjustments in its style of warfare in order to meet the distinctive challenges posed by an irregular enemy.”¹²⁴

The internal conflict in Colombia poses a direct threat to regional stability. Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil all share borders with Colombia and are affected to some degree by the crisis. Pace states,

¹²² Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in, *Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2007, available from <http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf>, (accessed February 25, 2008), 124.

¹²³ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute USAWC, January 2001), 18.

¹²⁴ Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, 2006; available from <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil>, (accessed August 16, 2007).

The spillover into neighboring countries largely results from the corrupting effect of the narcotics trade and inadequate state control of the border in remote areas. As the U.S. assists Colombia in building counter-drug capabilities, it should also address the specific needs of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, and other regional partners as well.¹²⁵

The U.S. is "part of the problem," according to Mance.

The problem is that, by focusing so heavily on Colombia, the U.S. cannot deal with transnational problems. For example, Plan Colombia neglects the issue of Colombian refugees, leading the Ecuadorian government to echo popular concerns about the economic burden of hosting these people. Ecuador has complained about the violation of its sovereignty by the Colombian military and the effects of fumigation in border regions. The country's president Rafael Correa has taken a strong stance against Plan Colombia, and the U.S. military presence in the region. Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez, has shown ideological sympathy with the FARC and the ELN.¹²⁶

The scenario in the Andean Ridge presents several structural problems that require analysis. The fragility of Andean democratic systems is cause for concern since these systems, by themselves, would probably be unable to solve internal or external crises. Relative agreement exists among the states in the Americas insofar as the main security threats come from non-state actors rather than from military attacks against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Non-state threats are more dramatic than previous ones and are asymmetric, in the sense of being "forms of attack against which States have no defense, and . . . tactics that decision makers will not abide."¹²⁷ After the attacks of September 11,

¹²⁵ Pace, 2000, 28.

¹²⁶ Henry Mance, "Colombia's Conflict and the Lack of a Regional Response: Why the United States is Part of the Problem," (January 8, 2007), <http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia250.htm>, (accessed January 25, 2008).

¹²⁷ Steven Lambakis, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet, *Understanding "Asymmetric" Threats to the United States* (National Institute for Public Policy, 2002), v.

terrorism became the main concern of the U.S. government. However, the Andean region has experienced a relatively low incidence of international terrorist activity.

This chapter focuses on the impacts on Ecuador and Venezuela. The significant general asymmetric threats in the larger Andean Region are summarized below. The situation in each Andean country has been described by the U.S. State Department.¹²⁸

Many incidents of violent urban crime occur in each country, particularly in the large cities. These incidents are associated with drug traffic and usage, trafficking of light weapons, and other illegal activities.¹²⁹

Bolivia has significant challenges to democratic rule by anti-government forces. Bolivia is heavily engaged in a major counter narcotics effort with significant support and partial funding from the U.S. Military training programs include technical training for counter narcotic operations, courses on civil-military relations, and resource management and human rights instruction to reinforce principles of democracy and civilian control of the military.¹³⁰

In Peru, the U.S. seeks to strengthen the government's ability to interdict and disrupt narcotics production and distribution. Training in counter narcotic operations, professional military education, resource management, logistics and equipment maintenance provide the tools to professionalize and modernize Peru's military. This training is particularly important to the demining efforts along Peru's border with Ecuador in support of the 1998 peace settlement. According

¹²⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006," (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006), available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74687.htm>, (accessed May 15, 2007).

¹²⁹ United Nations Security Council, 4048th Meeting, Agenda Small Arms, (New York, September 24, 1999), available from <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/docs/scpv4048e.pdf>, (accessed November 21, 2007), 18.

¹³⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training."

to the U.S. State Department, "the Peruvian military continues to conduct operations against insurgents and narco-terrorists while respecting the rule of law and human rights."¹³¹

In Colombia, the government restarted coca aerial eradication and increased offensive operations against narco-guerilla groups along the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan borders, which, as noted above, produces negative second order effects in those two countries.

Ecuador, a focus of this thesis, is a major drug-transiting country and is the site of U.S. activities that include counter narcotic operations, military instruction, resource management, logistics and equipment maintenance, and training to professionalize and modernize the local force. U.S. Special Operation Forces have trained the Ecuadorian military in demining and in fighting drug cartels and guerillas.¹³²

In Venezuela, the second focus of this thesis, the U.S. conducted combined airborne operations, light infantry, and weapons training before Chavez took office in 1999. Since Chavez became president, some senior military officers have been used for political purposes. The Armed Forces have received no U.S. training and the U.S. Military Liaison Group was expelled and relocated out of the Venezuelan military headquarters.¹³³

B. THE CASE OF ECUADOR

Ecuador has received a great deal of overflow effect from Colombia. The effects include refugees and guerillas crossing the border, and coca and heroin cultivation that has "migrated" cross-border from Colombia.¹³⁴ Violence and

¹³¹ U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training."

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Douglas Farah, "A Tutor to Every Army in Latin America, U.S. Expands Latin American Training Role," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1998), A01.

¹³⁴ Richard L. Millett, "Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2002, available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB14.pdf>, (accessed November 21, 2007), 1-2.

refugees are serious issues. Ecuador already faces a host of economic and political problems, including eight presidents in the last ten years and a foreign debt that is serviced with a large part of the national budget.¹³⁵

Ecuador began feeling Plan Colombia's negative second order effects several years ago. For example, the Colombian air force has pursued guerillas into Ecuadorian air space. And

aerial spraying is not only missing targets by hitting crops and forests in Colombia, but it is crossing the border and doing the same in Ecuador. Thus, success in Colombia might mean devastation, both environmental and social, for Ecuador or another neighboring country.¹³⁶

In 2007, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that "half a million civilians have crossed into Ecuador and Venezuela to avoid the violence,"¹³⁷ with perhaps 250,000 Colombians having fled to Ecuador from internal conflict.¹³⁸ Describing "legal" Colombian refugees, the UNHCR data in Tables 5 and 6 illustrates that Ecuador bears a disproportional burden.

¹³⁵ Clare Ribando, "Ecuador: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, Latin American Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, May 2, 2005, available from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47776.pdf>, (accessed November 12, 2007), 2.

¹³⁶ Kristine A. Herwig, "The Environment, Plan Colombia, and U.S. Aid," Macalester College, St. Paul, MN), 6.

¹³⁷ Mance.

¹³⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, "The Environment in the News," February 28, 2007, available from <http://www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/2007Feb28.doc>, (accessed January 27, 2008), 53.




Table 5. People of Concern to UNHCR 2000-2002¹³⁹

Country	Colombian refugees	Total Refugees
Peru	9	693
Ecuador	2756	2870 (3837 pending requests)
Venezuela	21	58 (940 pending requests)
Panama	920 (Temporary Protection)	

Source: UNHCR. To September 30, 2002

Table 6. Cross Border Number of Refugees¹⁴⁰

The relations between Ecuador and the U.S. are “generally good,” despite contention over relatively limited U.S. assistance.¹⁴¹ In 2004, SOUTHCOM Commander General James T. Hill said Ecuador had shown “the political will to secure its border with Colombia and to fight drug traffickers.” A review of the data

¹³⁹ P.W. Fagen, A.Fernandez Juan, F. Stepputat, and R.V. Lopez, “Internal Displacement in Colombia: National and International Responses,” Kongevej Working Paper, Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Based on data from the UNHCR (2002), June 2003, available from <http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/PatPubs/Internal%20Displacement-Colombia.pdf>, (accessed January 20, 2008), 9.

¹⁴⁰ “Internal Displacement in Colombia: National and International Responses,” P.W. Fagen, A. Fernandez Juan, F. Stepputat, and R.V. Lopez, (Kongevej Working Paper, Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, June 2003), available from <http://isim.georgetown.edu/Publications/PatPubs/Internal%20Displacement-Colombia.pdf>, (accessed January 20, 2008), 10.

¹⁴¹ Clare Ribando, “Ecuador: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, Latin American Affairs, (Defense and Trade Division, May 2, 2005), available from <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47776.pdf>, (accessed November 12, 2007), 5.

in Table 7 and annual evaluation field trips to the Ecuador–Colombia border leads the author of this thesis to agree with Hill’s claim that “despite limited resources, the Ecuadorian military has placed many of its best troops on its northern frontier and has established cross border communications with the Colombian military. [Moreover] Ecuador continues to host one of the Southern Command’s Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) in Manta, which has been especially critical in providing coverage on the eastern Pacific vector of drug smuggling.”¹⁴²

(in millions \$)

	ACI		FMF	IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.			
FY2000	13.20	8.00	—	0.50	21.70
FY2001	2.20	—	—	0.60	2.80
FY2002	15.00	10.00	—	0.60	25.60
FY2003	15.00	15.90	1.00	0.60	32.50
FY2004	20.00	15.00	—	—	35.00
FY2005	10.90	14.90	—	—	25.80
FY2006	8.40	11.40	—	—	19.80
FY2007	8.90	8.40	0.03	0.05	17.38
Total	93.60	83.60	1.03	2.35	180.58

Sources: Figures are drawn from the annual State Department and USAID Congressional Budget Justifications for fiscal years 2002 through 2007. FY2007 figures are from P.L. 110-5.

Table 7. U.S. Counter narcotics Assistance to Ecuador, FY 2000-FY 2007¹⁴³

¹⁴² General James T. Hill, United States Army Commander, United States Southern Command Before the 108th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, (April 1, 2004), 10.

¹⁴³ Veillette, 10.

1. Ecuador's Major Contribution to the Situation: The Cooperative Security Location/ Forward Operating Location (CSL/FOL) in Manta

The U.S. has operated military bases in Latin America since the early 1900s, establishing army camps in Cuba during the Spanish-American war and in Panama at the beginning of U.S. canal construction. According to John Lindsay-Poland,

These bases have served, explicitly, to protect U.S. government and commercial interests in the region. More recently, the U.S. military interest and funding for Plan Colombia, gave rise to a proliferation of new U.S. bases and military access agreements in the region.¹⁴⁴

After the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama , some wing assets moved to Puerto Rican airfields and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Aruba, Curacao, El Salvador and Ecuador.¹⁴⁵ As Figure 5 illustrates, a northern drug source zone was based from Aruba and Curacao; the Andean region FOL was planned for Manta, Ecuador, and in 1999, a Central American FOL was established in Comalapa, El Salvador.¹⁴⁶ The FOLs monitor the skies and waters of the region and “are key to increased surveillance operations in the United States’ Andean counter-drug and counter-terror wars.”¹⁴⁷ Intelligence on

¹⁴⁴ Lindsay-Poland, 1.

¹⁴⁵ “United States Southern Command: Profile of the U.S. Southern Command,” USSOUTHCOM homepage, April 1998 [database on-line], available from <http://www.usUSSOUTHCOM.com/USSOUTHCOM/graphics/profile.htm>, (accessed on May 27, 2007).

¹⁴⁶ General Charles E. Wilhelm, “The Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism,” Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on 22 June 1999, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/000215-col-usa-usia4.htm, (accessed October 15, 2007).

¹⁴⁷ Marty Kauchak, “Eyes in the Sky,” *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 2001, available from <http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2001/April/eyes.htm>, (accessed November 12, 2007).

suspicious flights gathered from FOLs and radar sites are shared with host nation security forces, which carry out the “endgame operation” of contacting and forcing or shooting down suspected smugglers.¹⁴⁸



Figure 5. Latin American FOLs after Howard AFB in Panama, was closed¹⁴⁹

In 1999, the U.S. and Ecuador ratified a ten-year cooperation agreement that established the Manta FOL as the strategic site for U.S. anti-narcotics operations. For regional anti-drug efforts, the Ecuadorian base is located in “the key geopolitical strategic location.”¹⁵⁰ According to Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Manta Air Base is “crucial to achieving “full [air] coverage in the region.”¹⁵¹ Therefore, “Ecuador plays a significant role in the ACI, together with Colombia’s cooperative attitude towards the U.S. policy on drug trafficking.”¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ “U.S. Counter-Drug Assistance to Latin America: A Program-by-Program Overview,” *Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)* 32. [database on-line], available from http://www.wola.org/publications/ddhr_military_overview.pdf, (accessed June 4, 2007).

¹⁴⁹ Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, “The War on Drugs” meets the “War on Terror,” *The Center For International Policy’s, Colombian Program*, (February 2003), available from <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.htm>, (accessed December 20, 2007).

¹⁵⁰ Maria Zosa Saberon De La Cruz, *Us Military Presence in Latin America: Making the Manta Forward Operating Location Work*, (Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003), 3.

¹⁵¹ “Ecuador: The Newest Front-Line State,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 26, June 30, 2001, 1.

¹⁵² General Charles E. Wilhelm, 1999.

Although counter-drug FOLs are critical to the execution of the DoD's detection and monitoring mission, "opposition among local constituencies remains a factor that could hinder further cooperation from potential partners."¹⁵³ In fact, Ecuadorian social actors neither trust the U.S. presence and influence in the country nor agree with the incipient U.S. aid in comparison with their country's effort to fight the narcotics business.

The Manta FOL is a success.¹⁵⁴ In 2005, Craddock affirmed that "since the establishment of the Manta CSL/FOL in 1999, the information resulting from its operations has resulted in the seizure of cocaine with a street value of \$3.4 billion."¹⁵⁵ According to Lt. Col. Javier Delucca, commander of the forward operating location's 478th Expeditionary Operations Squadron, "aircrews flew more than 1,200 missions from Manta in 2006, and helped seize more than 258 tons of illegal drugs with an estimated street value of \$5.2 billion." By July 2007, he said, over 800 missions had helped capture \$2.4 billion worth of drugs that year.¹⁵⁶ U.S. embassy officials in Quito claim that more than 60 percent of the illegal drugs captured on the high seas of the eastern Pacific in 2006 resulted from information gathered by surveillance flights from Manta.¹⁵⁷ According to a 2005 report to Congress, "since 2000, U.S. detection and monitoring operations

¹⁵³ De La Cruz.

¹⁵⁴ Arana-Barradas.

¹⁵⁵ Craddock, "The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) works to combat terrorism and strengthen stability in Latin America and the Caribbean," Testimony before The 109th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, March, 2005), available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html> (accessed August 6, 2007).

¹⁵⁶ Arana-Barradas.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

from the Manta FOL has seized more than 250 tons of cocaine,"¹⁵⁸ a record of success echoed the following year by Jose Ruiz, spokesperson for U.S. SOUTHCOM.¹⁵⁹

2. Ecuador's Perceptions and Expectations

In the last five years, relations between Ecuador and Colombia have been tense. There are many causes. One is fumigation. Ecuador complained unsuccessfully to the government of Colombia and to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN that Colombian aerial eradication harmed people, animals and crops on the Ecuadorian side of the border.¹⁶⁰ Other sources of tension include the failure of mutual agreements for information exchange, Colombian military actions on Ecuadorian sovereign territory, and increased criminal violence, refugees and illegal activities.¹⁶¹ Because of declining conditions and inadequate support and cooperation from the Washington–Bogotá axis, Ecuador does not want the Manta base agreement renewed after 2009. Despite those successes from U.S. perspective, in 2006, the Ecuadorian ambassador to Colombia was twice recalled to Quito for consultations, a diplomatic signal of a high level of discontent. As researcher Fredy Rivera notes, “the most tangible piece of real estate that symbolizes these negative feelings has, over time, become Manta.”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Clare Ribando, “Ecuador: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations,” (CRS Report for Congress, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Trade Division, May 2, 2005), 5.

¹⁵⁹ Sam Logan, “U.S. Faces Eviction from Ecuadorian Base,” International Relations and Security Network, Global Policy Forum, January 12, 2007, available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/challenges/general/2007/0112ecuadorevict.htm>, (accessed December 20, 2007).

¹⁶⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2007, 123.

¹⁶¹ Logan.

¹⁶² Fredy Rivera, professor and researcher with the Ecuadorian branch of the Latin American University for Social Sciences, cited in Logan.

Situated adjacent to guerilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas in southern Colombia, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia's cooperative neighbors. The Ecuadorian response to the Colombian crisis is characterized by a desire to remain neutral in order to avoid becoming more engaged in the dynamics of a conflict that is viewed as a sovereignty issue.¹⁶³ Unlike Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, Ecuador has not designated Colombian leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries as terrorist organizations or belligerents.¹⁶⁴

Ecuador's concern about escalation of the conflict is due to fears that Colombian military efforts against guerillas will result in even more rebel incursions and a larger refugee crisis.¹⁶⁵ A neutral stance highlights the necessity for renewed cooperation with Colombia and other nations in the region to address the root cause of the conflict. Ecuador, in contributing to U.S. counter drug success with the Manta FOL, reasonably expects an increase in external support. The 200 million dollars in U.S. aid in the last seven years, compared with 5.3 billion dollars received by Colombia in the same period, does not adequately help Ecuador overcome the negative impacts of being Colombia's neighbor.¹⁶⁶

3. Ecuador's Actions

Since Rafael Correa took office in 2007, Washington has worried about losing the Manta FOL. Correa has already publicly discussed using the base as

¹⁶³ Judith A. Gentleman, *The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2001, available from <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps13437/lps13437/andes.pdf>, (accessed November 21, 2007), 17.

¹⁶⁴ "Ally to Kidnappers: Venezuela's Hugo Chávez endorses Colombian Groups Known for Abductions, Drug Trafficking and Mass Murder," *Washington Post*, January 16, 2008, available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>, (accessed January 22, 2008).

¹⁶⁵ "Anti-Colombian Sentiment on the Rise in Ecuador," *BBC Monitoring Americas*, October 10, 2005; "Latin America and U.S. War on Terror: Spillover From Colombia," *Latin American Newsletters*, May 2003; "Colombian FARC Guerrilla Base Discovered in Ecuador," *EFE News Service*, November 21, 2003. Cited in Veillette.

¹⁶⁶ Veillette, 7-12.

an international airport to link South America with Asia.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the Ecuadorian Agency for Northern Border Development (UDENOR) has continued to implement Plan Ecuador, the master plan intended to be a "preventative alternative development" to illegal crops.¹⁶⁸

While Ecuador would prefer to remain neutral, it has taken steps to blunt the effects of potential spillover in key areas. In the late 1990s, the Ecuadorian military increased its troop presence on the common border as much as 800 percent to avert guerilla and illicit activity.¹⁶⁹ To address the increased refugee flows, Ecuador has lobbied for additional funding from outside sources and is currently working with the UNHCR. Despite Ecuador's efforts to restore security, irregular armed Colombian groups continue to operate openly, and violence and the refugee problem remain major issues on the border.¹⁷⁰

C. THE CASE OF VENEZUELA

Colombia and Venezuela are each other's third-largest trading partners, after the U. S. and the European Union. The two governments have had an uneasy relationship for many years, stemming from border disputes and concern about the other's intentions.¹⁷¹ Venezuelan President Chávez has provided at least tacit and probably material support to the Colombian rebels and has embarked on a major arms buildup.¹⁷² By early 2005, Venezuela had agreed to

¹⁶⁷ Logan.

¹⁶⁸ United States Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2007, 123.

¹⁶⁹ Federal Research Division, "Country Profile: Colombia," February 2007, available from <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Colombia.pdf>, (accessed November 25, 2007), 26.

¹⁷⁰ Veillette.

¹⁷¹ John C. Edmunds, "Brave New Wealthy World: Winning the Struggle for World Prosperity," *Financial Times*. Prentice Hall, Business & Economics, June 2003, 75.

¹⁷² Julia E. Sweig, "What Kind of War For Colombia?" *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, available from, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9737/julia-e-sweig/what-kind-of-war-for-colombia.html>, (accessed November 25, 2007).

purchase 100,000 Kalashnikov-style assault rifles and at least 10 helicopters from Russia, and had signed a deal to purchase ten transport aircraft and eight patrol boats from Spain.¹⁷³

Historically, relations between Colombia and Venezuela have been tense, with tensions tending to rise and fall depending on the specifics of the issue at hand. With regard to Plan Colombia, Venezuela has taken two different approaches: the pre-Chavez and post-Chavez responses.¹⁷⁴ In the 1990's Venezuela became increasingly concerned with the Colombian situation and built up troop strength along its border to deal with insurgents. The Venezuelan reaction changed in 1999 when Chavez took office. At first, Chavez declared himself "neutral" on the conflict, which many took as meaning he planned to recognize the FARC and the ELN.¹⁷⁵ There are long-held suspicions that Chavez has supported leftist Colombian guerrillas. Although he denies such support, the State Department's Terrorism Report maintains that units of Colombian narco guerillas often crossed into Venezuela "to rest and regroup with relative impunity."¹⁷⁶

A significant amount of spillover activity has taken place at the Venezuelan border with Colombia over the years. As relations between these two countries worsened, the Colombian President declared in November 2007

¹⁷³ Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O'Brien, and John E. Peters, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, (The RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, www.rand.org, 2007), 245.

¹⁷⁴ Elega Carolina Jiménez Sandoval, *Understanding Modern Charismatic Leadership: Hugo Chávez and the 'Peaceful Revolution' in Contemporary Venezuelan Politics*, Ph. D. Dissertation, Waseda University, September 2005, available from <http://dspace.wul.waseda.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2065/5410/1/Honbun-4239.pdf>, (accessed November 21, 2007), 203-207.

¹⁷⁵ Richard Gott and Georges Bartoli, *Hugo Chavez: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela* (New York, Verso, 2005), 19.

¹⁷⁶ Cited by Mark P. Sullivan and Nelson Olhero, "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, September 4, 2007, 39.

that Chavez had broken protocol. He abruptly terminated the Venezuelan president's role as a mediator with the FARC in seeking a comprehensive release of hostages.¹⁷⁷

In January 2008, the former Colombian minister of defense declared that relations between the countries "may be at their lowest point in history" due to Chavez's move to have the FARC and the ELN recognized as belligerents.¹⁷⁸ The Venezuelan Congress agreed to Chavez's request, a position that seemed to foster a confrontational stance towards Colombia. Chavez told Venezuela's National Assembly "although it will bother some people, I say the FARC and the ELN are not terrorist bodies. They are armies, true armies that occupy space in Colombia."¹⁷⁹ He added, "All governments of the Americas and Europe that have the FARC and the ELN listed as terrorist organizations should un-list them because it is all just a mere pressure from the U.S.. They are insurgent forces that have a Bolivarian and political project that is respected here."¹⁸⁰ Some political observers categorized this stance as a political-diplomatic victory for the guerilla groups, an interpretation reinforced by Chavez's decision to suspend cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in 2005.¹⁸¹

Table 8 provides indicators of problems at the Colombia-Venezuela frontier, where a porous border leads to significant opportunities for armed groups and criminal networks to smuggle weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The State Department notes that Venezuela continued to be "unwilling or unable

¹⁷⁷ Chris Kraul, "Chavez keeps up campaign to get rebels off terrorist list," *Los Angeles Times*, January 20, 2008), available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/latinamerica/la-fg-farc20jan20,1,5969755.story>, (accessed January 25, 2008).

¹⁷⁸ Colombian ex-Minister of Defense, Rafael Pardo, cited by Chris Kraul.

¹⁷⁹ "FARC are not terrorists: Venezuela's Chavez," *Euronews*, available from <http://www.euronews.net/index.php?page=info&article=464307&lng=1>, (accessed January 20, 2008).

¹⁸⁰ Daniel, "Chavez: the Colombian FARC is not a terrorist group," *Venezuela News and Views*, January 11, 2008), available from <http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com/2008/01/chavez-colombian-farc-is-not-terrorist.html>, (accessed January 16, 2008).

¹⁸¹ Veillette, 12.

to assert control over its 1,400-mile border with Colombia.”¹⁸² Consequently, Colombian narco-guerillas regard Venezuelan border territory as safe area to conduct cross-border incursions, transship arms and drugs, rest, and secure logistical supplies, as well as to commit kidnappings and extortion for profit.¹⁸³

	Indicators	Sub-indicators
01.	Lack of state penetration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Absence of state institutions - Lack of physical infrastructure - Social and cultural resistance
02.	Lack of monopoly of force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organized armed group - Criminal networks - Population with access to arms
03.	Lack of border control	
04.	External interference	

Table 8. Indicators of Ungovernability, Colombia-Venezuela Border¹⁸⁴

Table 9 shows the amount of money that Venezuela has received in U.S. ACI assistance over the past eight years. Veillette notes that although ACI programs in Venezuela focus on counternarcotics cooperation and judicial reform, the Administration did not request any ACI funding for Venezuela for FY2008. This is not a surprise, given the weak relationship between the administrations.

¹⁸² U.S. Department of State, 2004b, 86.

¹⁸³ Rabasa et al., 258-259.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 246.

(in millions \$)

	ACI		IMET	Total
	Interdict.	Alt. Dev.		
FY2000	4.20	—	0.40	4.60
FY2001	1.20	—	0.40	1.60
FY2002	5.00	—	0.50	5.50
FY2003	2.10	—	0.70	2.80
FY2004	5.00	—	—	5.00
FY2005	2.98	—	—	2.98
FY2006	2.23	—	—	2.23
FY2007	1.00	—	0.04	1.04
Total	23.71	—	2.04	25.75

Sources: Figures are drawn from the annual State Department and USAID Budget Justifications for fiscal years 2002 through 2007. Venezuela did not receive FMF during this period. FY2007 figures are from P.L. 110-5.

Table 9. U.S. Counter narcotics Assistance to Venezuela, FY 2000- FY 2007¹⁸⁵

1. Venezuela's Perceptions and Expectations

The perceptions and expectations of Venezuela cannot be separated from the political agenda of its current president. According to Greg Palast, to gain regional support and enhance his global prestige, Chavez seeks to spread his “Bolivarian Revolution” by rejecting the Washington and International Monetary Fund neo-liberal agenda and replacing it, in the words of the *The Wall Street Journal*, with an “International Hugo Fund.” Chavez uses the nation's oil money to provide other forms of financial aid by trading with governments of the left that now preside over about half of the population of the region.¹⁸⁶ Mark Weisbrot writes, “He is trying to assemble a bloc of leftward swinging nations that can be

¹⁸⁵ Veillette, 12.

¹⁸⁶ Greg Palast, “Hugo Chavez in His Own Words,” *The Progressive*, July 26, 2006, available from <http://www.alternet.org/audits/38549/>, (accessed November 26, 2007).

set against the U.S. on matters of trade and international leadership.”¹⁸⁷ Chavez has also strengthened the monopoly of OPEC revenues by eliminating contracts from some foreign oil companies.¹⁸⁸

Chavez rejects U.S. and European support, focusing on Latin American solidarity. His strategy is based on open confrontation with the U.S.¹⁸⁹ Franklin Foer writes, “Chavez embraces a homegrown style of nationalism underpinned by Venezuelan heroes while breaking with imported models of Marxism-Leninism.”¹⁹⁰ He presents Venezuela as a victim of U.S. imperialism and he has assumed an important role on the world political stage with his attitude of confrontation.¹⁹¹

2. U.S. Assessment of Venezuela

The Bush administration’s reaction to Chavez combines hostility and provocation.¹⁹² This has forced the U.S. to adopt a defensive stance of “for the U.S., or against us,” an approach with no room for maneuver that appears to be the wrong strategy.¹⁹³

In 2005 and 2006, the Bush administration specified that Venezuela failed “to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements,” and did not cooperate in antiterrorist efforts. As a result, U.S. defense materiel and services cannot be sold to Venezuela.¹⁹⁴ The U.S. National Security Strategy of

¹⁸⁷ Mark Weisbrot, “Is Hugo Chavez a Threat to Stability?” Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, D.C., April 4, 2007, available from International Affairs Forum, <http://ia-forum.org>, (accessed April 20, 2007).

¹⁸⁸ Sullivan and Olhero, 34.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 15.

¹⁹⁰ Franklin Foer, “The Talented Mr. Chavez,” *Atlantic Monthly*, May 2006, 14.

¹⁹¹ Sullivan and Olhero, 17.

¹⁹² Alice M. Chacon, “Venezuelan President Says His Greatest Rival is George W. Bush,” Associated Press, June 12, 2004.

¹⁹³ “Venezuela-U.S. Animosity Unlikely to Ease.”

¹⁹⁴ Sullivan and Olhero, i.

March 2006 declares that Venezuela's president is "a demagogue awash in oil money [who] is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region."¹⁹⁵ The State Department's annual *Country Reports on Terrorism* for 2007 asserted that Chavez "persisted in public criticism of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, deepened Venezuelan relationships with Iran and Cuba, and was unwilling to prevent Venezuelan territory from being used as a safe haven by Colombian terrorist groups."¹⁹⁶ Those groups, on the U.S. State Department's list of "foreign terrorist organizations," are effectively international outlaws.¹⁹⁷

3. Venezuela's Actions

To remain in power, the Venezuelan President is conducting a strategy based on the following elements of national power.

In the diplomatic field, Chavez is applying a hostile and audacious foreign policy against "the empire." He focuses on attaining greater Latin American integration in order to be less dependent on U.S. influence. He uses "oil diplomacy"¹⁹⁸ and the promise of "pluri-polarity" to make Venezuela a new regional power. It also enhances his popularity domestically and in other countries.¹⁹⁹ He incites controversy in foreign policy by making high-profile visits to Cuba, South America, and the Middle East and making strident speeches before the UN General Assembly, all while supposedly flirting with leftist guerillas and making a territorial claim on Guyana.²⁰⁰

In the military field, Chavez is dramatically increasing the size of his armed forces and buying large amounts of armaments and equipment. Chavez wants to

¹⁹⁵ National Security Strategy of the United States, 2006, 15.

¹⁹⁶ Cited by Sullivan and Olhero, 39.

¹⁹⁷ Bill Weinberg, "FARC: 'Terrorists' or 'belligerents'?" January 20, 2008, available from <http://www.4report.com/node/4962>, (accessed January 23, 2008).

¹⁹⁸ Sullivan and Olhero, 37.

¹⁹⁹ Foer.

²⁰⁰ Sullivan and Olhero, 37-39.

arm the people so they can form a guerilla resistance against any U.S. invasion.²⁰¹ For that purpose, in January 2008 he proposed that the members of the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of America (ALBA)--Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela and Dominica Island--create a defense council and military forces for the organization because "the enemy is one, the empire."²⁰² He has begun organizing citizen militias, changed from American to Cuban military advisors, and assigned citizens to read books on asymmetric warfare. Fortunately, there is no evidence that the Chavez administration has weapons of mass destruction, nor is there evidence it is trying to get them.²⁰³

In the economic and financial fields, he has used Venezuela's oil wealth to buy a substantial leadership role in the region. He is encouraging other countries to create a Bank of the South to "free the region from the international finance system." According to international reports, Venezuela withdrew all of its assets held in U.S. banks and transferred them to the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland.²⁰⁴ The U.S. wants to improve its relationship with Latin America by expanding commerce through the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) agreement, but Chavez has proposed an alternative regional trade agreement that would leave out the U.S.²⁰⁵

In the social field, Chavez always seeks great psychological impact on the poor, who have felt cheated by generations of politicians, by supporting programs that he calls "misiones" (a religious allusion to the Cuban approach of exporting

²⁰¹ Raúl Zibechi, "Chile and Venezuela: Myths and Realities of the Arms Race," Americas Program Center for International Policy, August 5, 2007, available from <http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2886.cfm>, (accessed January 15, 2008).

²⁰² Chris Carlson, "Venezuela, Nicaragua Propose Joint Military Force for Latin America," January 28, 2008, Venezuelanalysis.Com, available from <http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/3105>, (accessed January 29, 2008).

²⁰³ Foer, 17.

²⁰⁴ Sullivan and Olhero, 31.

²⁰⁵ Katie Dickson, "Chavez Checkbook Mission in the Caribbean Basin," Council of Hemispheric Affairs, August 29, 2007), from <http://www.coha.org/2007/08/29/competition-contributions-and-contracts-chavez%E2%80%99s-checkbook-mission-in-the-caribbean-basin/>, (accessed January 23, 2008)

socialism to Latin America). An economic and political supporter of Fidel Castro for more than \$2 billion annually,²⁰⁶ Chavez has been introducing all the elements of the Cuban system into Venezuela. This is a disturbing sign in a country where, in the words of Sullivan and Olhero, he “replaced the country’s multiparty democracy with a political system that revolves around himself, in essence a cult of personality.”²⁰⁷ Currently Venezuela has “humanitarian missions” comprised of several thousand Cuban doctors and teachers who live and work in the countryside. Programs include political indoctrination, government-subsidized grocery stores, neighborhood food programs, new schools, access to the internet, and public works projects.²⁰⁸ Because Chavez means hope, “some polls show that Venezuelans are more confident about their economic future than Canadians or Americans.”²⁰⁹

D. SUMMARY

According to trust and influence theories, the international community should assess each neighboring country’s performance in order to succeed against illegal groups. Clearly, Ecuador and Venezuela are so different as to require different approaches. Despite its lack of resources and a deep respect for issues of sovereignty, Ecuador has made a great effort to fight transnational threats in its own territory, and its Manta AFB is an excellent Forward Operating Location for the Pacific coast. Conversely, Venezuela, with its “oil diplomacy,” aims for its own goals, goals not broadly shared by the international community.

²⁰⁶ Frances Robles and Phil Gunson, “Cuba Spotlights Chávez Friendship,” *Miami Herald*, January 26, 2007.

²⁰⁷ Sullivan and Olhero, 4.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

²⁰⁹ “Profile: Hugo Chavez,” *BBC News*, February 11, 2006, available from <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk> (accessed August 20, 2007).

Given the challenges and keeping in mind politically sensitive issues of sovereignty, what is needed is cross-border cooperation on themes such as rural development, arms trade, aerial fumigation, treatment of refugees, rules of military engagement, and extradition agreements of suspected outlaws.

Unfortunately, the reality is that “U.S. policy is distorted towards Colombia and its primary mechanism for military and economic support to the region--Plan Colombia--has concentrated overwhelmingly on that country.”²¹⁰

If the U.S. is to develop a regional approach to the conflict, it will have to make compromises. In practice, this would mean a less militarized approach, with a greater role for alternative development strategies and negotiation. So far, the U.S. has shown no inclination for such a change. What the U.S. should realize is that a truly international and regional response is essential if the security situation in the Andean Region is to improve.²¹¹

To maintain the focus of this thesis on the supply side and get some lessons from the analysis, Chapter V highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Plan Colombia.

²¹⁰ Mance.

²¹¹ Ibid.

V. PLAN COLOMBIA: TEMPLATE FOR SUCCESS?

In theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice they are not.

Albert Einstein, 1921²¹²

The 21st century will see “increasing engagement with non-state and non-traditional actors of an asymmetric proportion.”²¹³ Fathali Moghaddam argues, “[T]he best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor.”²¹⁴ However, in the Andean Ridge, an atmosphere of insecurity is evident. Accepting that “even the most extreme and unusual forms of political behavior can follow an internal, strategic logic,”²¹⁵ and “even the most highly motivated terrorist groups--the Colombian narco-guerillas as well--can be deterred from certain courses of action,”²¹⁶ still, “successful deterrence depends on both the severity of the threat and its credibility.”²¹⁷ Due to the “difficulty of achieving perfect security,” winning the war on terrorism consists of reducing terror to an ineffective movement.²¹⁸

²¹² Ruhani Rabin, “Famous Quotes from Albert Einstein,” April 27, 2007, available from <http://www.ruhanirabin.com/2007/04/27/famous-quotes-from-albert-einstein/>, (accessed February 8, 2008).

²¹³ P. O'Meara, H. Mehlinger, and M. Krain, *Globalization and The Challenges of a New Century: A Reader* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000).

²¹⁴ Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” *American Psychologist*, February-March 2005, 161.

²¹⁵ Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 24.

²¹⁶ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism; It Can Be Done,” *International Security*, 2005/06, 120.

²¹⁷ Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 3, August 1995, 302.

²¹⁸ Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, August 2003, 356.

Addressing the Andean region as a scenario of political and social instability, Robert Rotberg, in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, claims that some states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence. Their incapacity to deliver political goods is the crucial element for understanding the boundaries of a fragile state.²¹⁹ The U.S., through SOUTHCOM, can have a significant positive influence in Latin America because "national" challenges like terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational crime that affect regional stability need cooperative solutions. A conference of the 34 American nations' defense ministers declared in October 2006 that collaboration in pursuing this goal is essential.²²⁰

A. LESSONS LEARNED

From the supply side, Plan Colombia has been moderately successful within a few narrowly defined and short-term parameters. It failed to achieve its original strategic objectives and has not produced core changes in Colombia that will ensure long-term and sustained success.²²¹ There are a few strengths that can be taken away from the plan, but most of the lessons learned involve pitfalls that should be avoided as the U.S. develops its regional engagement strategies.²²²

1. Strengths

According to some individuals familiar with the work of SOUTHCOM, there is little good to say about the national level network for Plan Colombia policy

²¹⁹ Robert Rotberg, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, (Brookings Institution Press, February 2003), 7-8.

²²⁰ Stavridis, 34.

²²¹ Jens Erik Gould, "The Failure of Plan Colombia," *The American Prospect*, April 23, 2007, available from http://tapdev.browsermedia.com/cs/articles?article=the_failure_of_plan_colombia, (accessed January 13, 2008).

²²² Johnson et al., 10.

development and little at the regional level strategy to support it.²²³ On the ground in Colombia, however, the various individuals, groups, and agencies charged with executing Plan Colombia have developed an outstanding network that has insured some success at this level.²²⁴

Unfortunately, the main effort of Plan Colombia is a temporary success story. A large amount of coca was eradicated in the early years of the program and trafficking routes were successfully interdicted. Arrests and extraditions of drug traffickers dramatically increased.²²⁵ The street price of cocaine increased, and the purity of the product decreased. All of this means that drugs were interdicted.²²⁶ These successes primarily resulted from men and women on the ground destroying crops, interdicting smuggling routes, and making arrests. This is a network success that can be attributed to the fact that the vast majority of civil servants and military personnel are committed professionals who will support a coordinated effort when they are completely immersed in it and living it on a day to day basis. The lesson is that an efficient network is the product of people interacting on a daily basis; it cannot be created solely through the formulation of a bureaucratic structure.²²⁷

2. Weaknesses

Plan Colombia resulted from a number of analytical errors and false assumptions that led to poor policy at a national level and a misguided strategy at a regional level.²²⁸ Despite tacit nods to the “soft-side” elements of the plan

²²³ Johnson et al.

²²⁴ Bantz J. Craddock, “Challenges in Latin America,” testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mar 2005, available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2005/Mar/16-51355.html>, (accessed August 2007).

²²⁵ Laura Carlsen, “Militarizing Mexico: The New War on Drugs,” *Foreign Policy In Focus*, July 12, 2007, available from <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4373>, (accessed January 11, 2008).

²²⁶ “Below the Radar,” 6.

²²⁷ Johnson et al., 11-12.

²²⁸ Myles R. Frechette, “Colombia and the United States: The partnership, but what is the endgame?” U.S. Army War College, Strategies Studies Institute, February 2007, iii.

associated with nation building, Plan Colombia was always about drugs on the streets of the U.S.²²⁹ The lesson here is to allow the expertise, within a coordinated network, guide policy formation. If the policy is flawed, no amount of money or brilliant execution will get the job done.

Nothing happens in a vacuum and that is especially obvious when analyzing political, social, and economic effects of policy on a region. Initially, Plan Colombia focused solely on Colombia and failed to consider the entire Andean region. Within a short period, trafficking routes, coca production, and guerillas began to move across the poorly controlled borders to escape the effects of Plan Colombia.²³⁰ Additionally, many within the Colombian government and the larger populace mistrusted or flat-out opposed the policies. Much of the problem was cultural with deep historic roots. Few if any regional dynamics were considered in the policy or strategy.²³¹ The lesson is that poorly coordinated policy will involve an entire network in dealing with the second, third, and tenth order effects. Rather than being driven by ideological or political agendas, the process should reflect the realities of the region.²³²

Implementation flows from strategy, which in turn flows from policy. Everything is linked. Plan Colombia focused almost exclusively on drug networks, and so strategy and implementation focused on interdiction networks. It is not surprising that the military became the lead agent for planning and execution, receiving 79% of the funding. (See Figure 6) Despite tacit support for strengthening the rule of law and institutions, there was no real focus on increasing the capacity to deliver services such as education, health care and

²²⁹ Rosenberg, 52.

²³⁰ Gabriel Marcella, "The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity," Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003, available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00007.pdf>, (accessed January 12, 2008), 48.

²³¹ Marcella, 63-64.

²³² Johnson et al., 12-13.

infrastructure.²³³ The lesson is to make sure the right tool is chosen to match the problem. Plan Colombia was overly military in planning and execution. A balanced network approach would have been more effective.²³⁴



Figure 6. Percentages of U.S. Contribution to Plan Colombia²³⁵

In conclusion, the plans, directives, and initiatives generated at the policy level should be familiar to the people who implement them as they flow to the operational level and beyond. In the international arena, if policy can maintain open international lines of communication, share resources, exchange information and new ideas, and provide positive or negative feedback in a bottom up and top down flow, then the walls of network problems will certainly be broken down.

Using the review of the literature and fieldwork that addressed sources from various countries, Chapter VI tests this study's hypothesis, broadly proposes a regional roadmap, and provides conclusions and recommendations to improve the relationships among the U.S. and Colombia's neighbors, Ecuador and Venezuela, whose reactions to Plan Colombia vary significantly.

²³³ Frechette, 23.

²³⁴ U.S. State Department, "U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia," Military Appropriations, 2001.

²³⁵ Colombia Report, "Plan Colombia and its Consequences in Ecuador," The Ecumenical Human Rights Commission of Ecuador (CEDHU), March 2001, The Information Network of the Americas (INOTA), available from http://www.colombiajournal.org/plancolombia_ecuador.htm, (accessed November 12, 2007).

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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

--Winston Churchill, 1942²³⁶

The Logical Framework approach argues that solving problems requires the involvement of all the stakeholders or actors in any way related to the problem at hand. To solve the problem,

[W]e must first understand the stakeholders. The objectives of this step are to reveal and discuss the interest and expectations of persons and groups that are important to the success of the plan.²³⁷

In an effort to avoid bias, the author of this thesis attempted to collect data from the perspective of representatives of different countries involved in the issue. Unfortunately, despite efforts, it was impossible to get the cooperation necessary to support a synergic strategy for a multilateral approach to the transnational threat of narcotic trafficking that fuels terrorist activities.²³⁸ Perhaps this is understandable given the political sensitivity of this particular issue.

According to the original thesis proposal and by profiting from various NPS sources and Ecuadorian military attaches in the U.S., Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, this research kept correspondence with civil and military officials who are familiar with this subject. Contacts were made with individuals associated with USSOUTHCOM, USSOCOM, FBI, the Treasury

²³⁶ Winston Churchill, from Churchill's speech at the Lord Mayor's Luncheon, Mansion House following the victory at El Alamein in North Africa, London, 10 November 1942, quoted in Famous Quotations/Stories of Winston Churchill. available from <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=388>, (accessed February 12, 2008).

²³⁷ "The Logical Framework Approach," NORAD Working Group, 4th ed., Norway, 1999, 28.

²³⁸ Correspondence flew in both directions between the author of this investigation and officials from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and the United States.

Department, SOF units, and with national and regional representatives in the Andean Ridge. Additionally, effective cooperation was obtained from 32 individuals such as a former Ecuadorian minister of defense, a former Ecuadorian Army commander, two police national directors of other Andean countries, as well as political analysts of the region, teachers from local universities, and military and police attaches. It is worth mentioning that the author of this investigation assured people interviewed that their comments would be anonymous.

This thesis uses data collected through interviews and in the formal and empirical literature, taking into account that a long-term solution demands an objective approach that rejects both nationalism and overconfidence. In any case, fighting a problem requires measures and actions be taken to confront it; avoidance is not a solution. Karl Von Clausewitz, two centuries ago, warned decision makers to use all the elements of power, not just military force, to create desired outcomes.

[T]here is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.²³⁹

This chapter presents the results of the research interviews and the hypothesis test, followed by conclusions, recommendations and a proposal for a broad regional road map for dealing with narco-terrorism as a transnational threat.

²³⁹ Karl Von Clausewitz quoted in Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translation by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 92-93, cited by Allen W. Batschelet, in "Effects-Based Operations for Joint War fighters," U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, May-June 2003, available from http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/june_2003/6_03_3.html#8, (accessed February 23, 2008).

A. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- Has Plan Colombia Ignored Neighboring Countries?




Figure 7. Question 1: Has Plan Colombia Ignored Neighboring Countries?

The majority answered this question affirmatively, but they also stated that Colombia, as a sovereign state, has the right to control policy inside its own borders. (As noted above, however, aerial coca eradication causes health and environmental damage that, with cross-border violence and illicit activities, affects the social environment along Colombian frontiers.)

- In response to Plan Colombia, what actions have been taken by Ecuador and Venezuela and how do you appraise those measures?




Figure 8. Question 2: Neighboring Countries' Actions

Officials highlight four main actions as the best way to mitigate and overcome Plan Colombia's negative second order effects. The first is to show deep respect for the international principle of non-intervention in Colombian sovereign issues, along with good will and cooperation in finding a peaceful, lasting solution to its internal conflict. Second, strengthen the military and police presence on the common border to avoid the spillover of illicit activities. Third, request international support to mitigate the refugee problem and introduce alternative development programs for the peasants' transition to a licit way of living. Finally, Ecuadorian officials state that their country has created its own plan, Plan Ecuador, as a policy that deals exclusively with social development along the common border.

- Related to Plan Colombia's negative second order effects on neighboring countries, what has been Washington and Bogotá's action, reaction, and/or effects?




Figure 9. Question 3: Washington-Bogota Action/Reaction/Effects

A consensus exists among neighboring countries that Washington–Bogotá have not produced an acceptable response. Moreover, neighbors demand alternate methods of coca eradication and control on Colombia's borders. Conversely, Colombian officials state that since drug trafficking and insurgency threaten democracy, they are asking for international cooperation to help resolve their internal conflict.

- What other factors in the Andean Ridge should influence U.S. policy and implementation?




Figure 10. Question 4: Other Andean Ridge Factors

Andean countries attribute narcotic trafficking to demand, not supply. However, taking a realistic approach to shared responsibilities, they ask for international aid to implement alternative development programs and improve human rights. Sovereignty is a key factor, but successful policy implementation must address other features, such as unstable democracies, high levels of corruption, ancestral land claims, and low levels of education.

- For the Andean countries, what are the main consequences of their refusal to sign the International Criminal Court (ICC) Article 98 agreement, which would benefit U.S. military personnel?




Figure 11. Question 5: Consequences of Refusal to Sign ICC Art. 98 Agreement

Four out of the five Andean countries did not sign the ICC Article 98 Agreement (Colombia was the exception). As a result, the U.S. reduced military assistance and applied coercive diplomatic and economic measures. The Washington – Bogotá axis kept a closer cooperation that was perceived by neighboring countries as a “unilateral” approach for fighting narco-terrorist activities based on an increase of Colombian military capabilities while producing a regional military misbalance.

- What lessons can be learned from the Andean Counter-drug Initiative and Plan Colombia?




Figure 12. Question 6: Plan Colombia and ACI Lessons Learned

The people interviewed raised interesting points, like the need for a political rather than a military solution, and the need to attack the root causes of the drug problem, while simultaneously fighting the supply side to increasing the street price of cocaine and reduce its purity. For better results on the supply side, they claim that Plan Colombia is a shortsighted policy with irrelevant results. They also suggest centralized planning and decentralized execution for improving the function of local actors. Finally, they recommend avoiding collateral damage from aerial coca eradication, the spread of violence that comes from Colombian state and non-state actors, and population displacement.

- What kind of policies, plans, programs, and/or strategies will Andean nations support politically?




Figure 13. Question 7: Initiatives that Andean Nations will Support Politically

Plan Colombia, as a politically sensitive issue, requires tactful treatment. The Andean nations have the will to support political initiatives that improve local development along with a multilateral approach to transnational threats. In light of Washington's full assistance to the Colombian government, they see themselves as put to one side. Thus, the Andean states will agree totally with any U.S. domestic anti-drug educational program and other initiatives to decrease the demand for illicit drugs.

B. TEST OF THE HYPOTHESIS

This investigation hypothesizes that Plan Colombia caused unintended negative consequences in neighboring countries due to a poor understanding of regional relationships. The research confirms the hypothesis. Plan Colombia produces several unintended negative effects on neighboring countries. Reaction to these effects varies from country to country, as is the case with Ecuador and Venezuela. There is no doubt that Colombia has stoically withstood internal violence for several decades. Nevertheless, the Washington–Bogotá axis has to realize that Colombia is neither geographically nor geopolitically isolated. Colombia is located in the heart of the Andean Ridge, and conflict there impacts

neighboring countries. Something must be done to avoid collateral damage from high levels of violence coming from Colombian state and non-state actors (i.e. the illegal presence and activities of a group of the FARC inside the Ecuadorian soil and its consequent Colombian armed forces' attack in March 1st, 2008)²⁴⁰, increased criminal activity, population displacement, and aerial coca eradication. Due to political sensitivities regarding sovereignty issues in the Andean region, a regional military-only approach to the Colombian conflict is not an acceptable solution. Nonetheless, countries can support initiatives originating with OAS's resolutions or other agreements while avoiding interference in sovereign issues.

C. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has addressed the United States' two main concerns in the Andean Region, drugs and insurgencies. Plan Colombia impacted drug trafficking in Colombia, although statistics indicate only a small decline in U.S. cocaine and heroin use.²⁴¹ The U.S. and Colombia have lost popular support throughout the region, but this support will return as Colombia and the U.S. address the needs of the rural population.²⁴² With careful identification of expectations and efforts to address them, the U.S. will regain trust, thus allowing better relationships and more options to exert influence in the region. Though this study criticizes some U.S. actions, the U.S. has increasing influence with the Colombian government and can earn the same increased influence with its other Andean partners.²⁴³

In a broad Andean overview, Bolivia's main concerns are its weak democracy and the drug issue. Peru is recovering its political stability while it

²⁴⁰ James Petras, "FARC-EP: The Cost of Unilateral Humanitarian Initiatives, Global Research," March 16, 2008, available from <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8356>, (accessed March 16, 2008).

²⁴¹ U.S. Department of State, "State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, 1996-2005."

²⁴² State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, 1996-2005.

²⁴³ Leech.

undergoes some insurgent and drug difficulties. Ecuador is still dealing with drug trafficking and the impact of Colombian state and non-state actors on its northern border. Colombia keeps managing despite internal violence; however, Colombian guerillas and terrorists no longer fight for ideals, seeking instead the economic benefits of drug export and some publicity. Finally, Venezuela President Hugo Chavez's agenda involves open confrontation with the U.S. to improve his leadership and remain in power.²⁴⁴

In the case of Ecuador, the U.S. State Department reports that the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments are “cooperating to improve interdiction of illicit drugs and chemicals and to improve Ecuadorian safeguards against terrorism and illegal migration, but more coordination and improvements are needed.”²⁴⁵ Nonetheless, as Mance notes, “Ecuador does not simply want [insignificant] resources, it also want its view to be incorporated into policy.”²⁴⁶

In the case of Venezuela, despite poor diplomatic relations with the U.S., the Council on Foreign Relations' report “Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region,” recommends

Maintaining and amplifying military-to-military relations between the two countries. Personnel exchanges, military contacts, and student exchanges at U.S. military schools are almost the only functioning components of the bilateral relationship and can serve as a vehicle for cooperation on counter drug and other security-related issues.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁴ Douglas Farah, “A Tutor to Every Army in Latin America, U.S. Expands Latin American Training Role,” *Washington Post*, July 13, 1998.

²⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2007, 124-125.

²⁴⁶ Henry Mance, “Colombia’s Conflict and the Lack of a Regional Response: Why the United States is Part of the Problem,” January 8, 2007, <http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia250.htm>, (accessed January 25, 2008).

²⁴⁷ Daniel W. Christman, John G. Heimann and Julia E. Sweig, *Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, 107.

To meet the challenge, U.S. decision makers should come up with a creative and effective new policy for the Andean Ridge drug supply side. As Douglas MacArthur stated, "New conditions require for solution, new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past."²⁴⁸ Lessons from the perspective of Field Marshal Sir William Slim are also relevant.

It is astonishing how obstinate allies are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up to date you are and how co-operative and big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary.²⁴⁹

In addition, Audrey Cronin points out that

a set of inaccurate or incomplete assumptions about the causes of terrorism often provides the impetus for policy prescriptions. These assumptions should be reexamined to improve the likelihood of success.²⁵⁰

The analysis of Plan Colombia highlights a few strengths and reveals some significant shortfalls, particularly with regard to strategic development at the regional level. In this scenario, trust and influence could be lost because some activities are not coordinated and synchronized, and the dissemination of contradictory information is extensive.

One of the most important cultural misperceptions involves expectations. Washington-Bogotá's expectations were to achieve military goals, like the defeat of drug cartels and narco-guerilla groups. In contrast, the local population's expectations were to have a reliable source of income from legal activities while governmental institutions provide electricity, food, medical care, labor

²⁴⁸ Cited by Charles M. Westenhoff in *Military Airpower, A Revised Digest of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007), available from <http://aupress.au.af.mil/Books/Westenhoff%201/Westenhoff%201.pdf>, (accessed February 25, 2008), 128.

²⁴⁹ Westenhoff, 222.

²⁵⁰ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Sources of Contemporary Terrorism," in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism, Elements of a Grand Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2004), 20.

opportunities, and safety from illegal groups. The governments needed visible actions to improve the average quality of life of local peasants who might be involved in the drug or narco-guerilla business but are trying to make a transition to legal occupations. As Baker notes, "There is a direct correlation between credibility and the ability to demonstrably improve the quality of life, physical security, and stability in a society."²⁵¹

The U.S. should implement a policy that includes political, diplomatic, and economic elements so that the focus on, and assistance to Colombia, is distributed in a more equitable way over the entire region.²⁵² The other countries have lost assistance unjustly because the U.S. considers them "less needy."²⁵³ Reality shows a high demand for drugs in the international market promotes narco-guerilla activity, and that activity is not just confined to Colombia. The Colombian "guerrillas" left behind their ideals and political projects many years ago (if, indeed, they ever had them).²⁵⁴ Success in this long and complex conflict requires U.S. decision makers develop a strategy that takes into account the lessons learned in Plan Colombia's seven-year history. The U.S. should also consider expanding the parameters of Plan Colombia to include countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela, to ensure that any gains in Colombia are not undermined. To influence the Andean region and prevent migration of problems to Colombia's neighbors, a broader drug control policy is needed.

D. SHAPING THE FUTURE

Keeping in mind that each country needs a different approach, the U.S. should encourage international synergistic efforts in the face of transnational threats. According to Lindsay-Poland,

²⁵¹ Ralph O. Baker, "The Decision Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 13-32.

²⁵² As stated in Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive, 1997.

²⁵³ Veillette, "Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2007 Assistance," 2007, 7-12.

²⁵⁴ Noriega.

To live up to the democratic ideals of its people, the U.S. should adopt a new security doctrine in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such a doctrine would value ties with civilians more than ties with the military as the sphere where democratic decision-making takes place. It would dedicate more resources to addressing the economic causes of conflict, rather than to building installations designed for the use of force.”²⁵⁵

Although Plan Colombia eroded locals’ trust through unsatisfied expectations, there is hope. The U.S. support of Plan Colombia essentially overhauled the Colombian military and security capacity and enabled Colombian President Alvaro Uribe’s landslide reelection.²⁵⁶ The reelection, made possible by 2005 legislation, was a landslide because the urban population is mostly protected from drug cartels and narco-guerrilla operations. A core segment of the population trust the Colombian and U.S. governments. As the Colombian security capacity expands, so does its positive influence over the populace. If the U.S. can prevent the spread of the problem and mitigate the negative second and third order effects in neighboring countries, it can re-build enduring alliances. As governments strengthen at the core, their influence might extend to the disaffected outside urban areas. In addition, the U.S. needs to investigate the culture of its partners in order to understand people’s expectations. Although no plan can satisfy everyone’s expectations, it can certainly identify what they are. As Jeffrey Pfeffer notes, emotion plays a large role in peoples’ actions.²⁵⁷

Given the choice of influencing you through your heart or your head, I will pick the heart. It’s your head that sends you off to check Consumer Reports when you are thinking of purchasing a new car. It’s your heart that buys the Jaguar or the Porsche. ²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Lindsay-Poland, 13.

²⁵⁶ U.S. State Department, “U.S. Assistance for “Plan Colombia,” Military Appropriations Act for FY 2001.

²⁵⁷ Williams and Andrade, 12.

²⁵⁸ Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 279.

Symbolic words and gestures do not require a large investment for a rewarding payoff. For example, a U.S. funded fresh water pipeline would not cost much, and while it would not address all of a village's needs, it would symbolize U.S. recognition and support. If the U.S. and its Andean partner governments listen to the peoples' words and try to satisfy their expectations, at least symbolically, it may just pay off. In the long run, the Andean and U.S. counter drug plans need to expand beyond the current, narrow focus on interdiction and address more of the peoples' needs. However, while the demand for drugs exists, someone, somewhere will satisfy that demand. A combination of stiffer U.S. domestic drug laws with efforts to limit supply will be more effective than addressing only supply.²⁵⁹

E. REGIONAL ROADMAP FOR THE ANDEAN RIDGE

Vanda Felbab-Brown confirmed the relationship between counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts, explaining how the production and trafficking of drugs fuels militarized conflicts.²⁶⁰ (See Figure 14) Given U.S. capability and credibility, fighting terrorist organizations should involve a strategy to convey to the adversary their low probability of success. Michael Vickers suggests, "Getting the right people in place to plan and execute the global war on terror ... is far more important than developing the right organizational arrangements."²⁶¹ Employing the right person for the right job is a simple concept, but it is not simple in reality. It is certainly not simple for Plan Colombia. Trager and

²⁵⁹ Williams and Andrade, 13.

²⁶⁰ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism," *Washington Quarterly*, 55–72, 2005, available from http://www.twq.com/05autumn/docs/05autumn_felbab.pdf, (accessed November 21, 2007), 55-56.

²⁶¹ Michael G. Vickers, "Implementing GWOT strategy: Overcoming interagency problems," United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, and Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Testimony online, March 15, 2006, available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2006_h/060315-vickers.pdf, (accessed May 29, 2007), 2.

Zargocheva write that any “new policy will emphasize the need to broaden the tools used to fight terrorism to more fully include the use of all instruments of power.”²⁶²

According to Philip Heymann, success against Andean Ridge narco-guerillas requires that any U.S. deterrence strategy be more persuasive than compellent or forceful.²⁶³ This requires attending to four critical areas: policy commitment, narco-terrorist financing, allies' and international cooperation, and a useful communication process along with an effective information campaign.




Figure 14. Drugs and Conflict: Actors in the Illicit Drug Economy²⁶⁴

²⁶² Trager and Zargocheva, 123.

²⁶³ Philip Heymann, *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).

²⁶⁴ Cornelius Graubner, "Development Oriented Drug Control Programme," *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*, 2007, available from <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0470.pdf>, (accessed January 12, 2008), 5, 9.

1. Policy Commitment

Although U.S. policymakers seem to regard worldwide terrorist activities and low intensity conflicts as less important in Latin America,²⁶⁵ they should be given a higher priority than they currently receive. Effective policy requires a systematic consideration of political, diplomatic, economic, legal, and social tools. Because narco-guerilla activities have second order effects that fill social needs in marginalized regions in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the U.S. should fund development programs to speed progress. The USAID should create opportunities for internally displaced and marginalized people to develop skills that will give them economic independence.²⁶⁶ Some officials state that this is in the U.S. interest.

Any policy should also support the OAS and its security efforts in the hemisphere. It should take advantage of already existing international instruments such as the Inter-American Conventions on Terrorism, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), and the Plan of Action on Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism.²⁶⁷ While counter-narcotics and counter-terrorist operations are key elements in any strategy, the U.S. through the OAS must work with local governments to resolve political and economic issues.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Crenshaw, 75-76.

²⁶⁶ Johnson.

²⁶⁷ "Inter-American Convention against Terrorism," Organization of American States, June 2002, available from http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGres1840_02.htm, (accessed November 4, 2007).

²⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, "Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy," *Latin America Report* No. 6, Bogota/Brussels, November 13, 2003, available from <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/icg-col-13nov.pdf>, (accessed January 12, 2008), 13.

2. Disrupt Narco-Terrorist Financing

A second priority is to disrupt terrorists' financing, specifically formal and underground methods for transferring funds across borders.²⁶⁹ The U.S. and its allies should expand counter-terrorist financing operations through three main actions. First, support local government efforts to confiscate accounts, block narco-terrorist funds in the U.S. financial system, and pursue money-laundering activities.²⁷⁰ Second, disrupt formal and informal narco-terrorist financial infrastructures.²⁷¹ Third, apply sanctions such as visa restrictions and extradition to the U.S., as this is the sanction that terrorists and drug criminals fear most.²⁷²

3. Allies and International Cooperation

Allies perceive the Bush administration's approach in the global fight against narco-terrorism as based too much on military action, and too little on transnational diplomatic actions.²⁷³ Chris Patten, the European Union's external affairs commissioner, states,

It is almost impossible to deal with the dark side of globalization--terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and insecurity--unless it is a result of a multilateral engagement.²⁷⁴

This means that all involved or affected countries are respected as equal partners. Martha Crenshaw suggests that "U.S. grand strategy should not ignore

²⁶⁹ "National Drug Control Strategy," available from <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/budget2002.pdf>, (accessed November 9, 2007).

²⁷⁰ Sullivan.

²⁷¹ "National Drug Control Strategy" FY 2004.

²⁷² Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" *World Politics* 54, April 2002, 390.

²⁷³ Martha Crenshaw, "Terrorism, Strategies, and Grand Strategies," in Walter Reich ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 84-86.

²⁷⁴ Richburg Keith, "Europe, U.S. Diverging On Key Policy Approaches," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, March 4, 2002, A13.

interdependence in the domain of international security.”²⁷⁵ Cronin argues that “the projection of domestic civil conflict through international terrorism is not just an American problem; it may be a systemic challenge for the international community.”²⁷⁶

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “The nation is at war with terrorist organizations that pose a threat to U.S. security and other societies that cherish the principles of self-government.”²⁷⁷ However, American influence engenders resistance and opposition in many parts of the world. Therefore, the U.S. should encourage and support Andean allied countries' efforts to implement stronger counter-terrorism policies. Such a commitment, according to Gabriel Marcella,

would make the U.S. a more credible and effective ally, increase chances for success in the overall drug war, strengthen regional security in the conflicted Andean area, and make a dramatic improvement in international law and order.²⁷⁸

4. Communication Process

Good words should be followed by good deeds to develop enduring trust and that message must get out through a regional Information Operations (IO) campaign. It will be more likely to succeed if it is fast and honest, using a few simple, accurate, consistent, and frequently repeated messages.²⁷⁹ Themes and messages focused on specific audiences must be developed and distributed quickly. Leaders have to engage the media periodically and quickly after an

²⁷⁵ Crenshaw, 90.

²⁷⁶ Cronin, 37.

²⁷⁷ *National Military Strategic Plan 2006 for the War on Terrorism*, Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., February 2006, 1.

²⁷⁸ Marcella, 63.

²⁷⁹ Ralph O. Baker, “The Decision Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations,” *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 4.

incident occurs to get the truth out to the people and to stay ahead of the adversary's disinformation and rumor campaigns.

A successful communication strategy will “insure maximum beneficial impact on the perceptions of target audiences based on truthful information.”²⁸⁰ Not talking to the press benefits the insurgents.²⁸¹ American policy needs an excellent communication strategy and information campaign targeted towards an audience that will properly understand the signals sent by the U.S. and its allies.²⁸² The media influences this process. For example, in the Arab world and regions with Islamic roots, people will not embrace an English-language news agency as their sole source of information. Applying this reasoning to the Andes, for the U.S. to influence a particular audience, it has to come up with creative, culturally relevant ways to do so.²⁸³

F. FINAL THOUGHT

Keeping in mind the significant regional variations in support and reactions to Plan Colombia, a serious U.S. commitment to political and economic policies will be more effective than military efforts against unconventional adversaries. A popular proverb says, “One must be and also appear to be.” Good American policy in the region requires an excellent communication strategy and information campaign to show that the U.S. intends the best for the Andes region.

²⁸⁰ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategic Plan 2006 for the War on Terrorism*, Washington, D.C., February 2006, 30.

²⁸¹ Baker, 18.

²⁸² Arreguin-Toft, 123.

²⁸³ Chris Suellentrop, “It’s just as fair as CNN,” *MSN Online*, April 2, 2003, available from <http://slate.msn.com/id/2081057/>, (accessed November 20, 2007).

APPENDIX



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (09/02 M.Chin)

Figure 15. Andean Counter-drug Initiative Countries²⁸⁴

²⁸⁴ Veillette, 21.

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